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ABSTRACT
From the early days of the Republic, Congress and the federal courts grappled with the government’s
rights to own or use patents it issued. Courts rejected the British “Crown Rights” rule that allowed
the sovereign to practice whatever patents it issued. Instead, the federal government was
conceptualized as a legal person on par with any other persons with regard to issued patents. But,
this simple rule presented challenges as complexities arose in three intertwined patent rights
scenarios. The first involved inventions by government employees. The second revolved around
government and government contractor use of patents held by private citizens. And the third
involved inventions by federal contractors and their employees arising under federal funding. While
these three scenarios seem quite distinct today, nineteenth and early twentieth century courts often
treated them as overlapping. The confusion was not resolved until the mid-twentieth century when
a combination of executive branch and Congressional legislation set the roots of current government
patent policy. This Article reviews the history in detail and illuminates current government patent
policy debate occurring through such seemingly diverse cases as Stanford v. Roche and Zoltek Corp.
v. United States.
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TAKING, TORT, OR CROWN RIGHT?: THE CONFUSED EARLY HISTORY OF
GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY
SEAN M. O’CONNOR*
INTRODUCTION AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
Outside of the federal government’s commonly understood role as an issuer of
patents, it is also a significant owner of patents. Further, it must frequently practice
(or have practiced on its behalf) inventions claimed in private citizens’ patents. On
one level, it seems trivial that the government itself can own patents. On another
level, this is an odd proposition because, as the sovereign that is actually granting
the patents in the first place, why does the government need to hold patents itself?
After all, it should be able to simply exercise its eminent domain powers to practice
any patent it wishes.1 In the alternative, it should be able to practice patents owned
by others with impunity based on principles of sovereign immunity.2 However,
because the patent grant has traditionally been viewed as not falling cleanly within
the framework of either personal or real property,3 the legal implications of
unauthorized government use of privately held patents have been likewise murky.
Accordingly, the first consideration must be the nature of the patent grant in the
United States to determine exactly what the government may be taking when it
engages in unauthorized practice of a private party’s patent. In particular, why
would some limited, non-authorized government use of a citizen’s patented invention
rise to the level of a taking when no property seems to have been taken? After all,
when one citizen engages in the unauthorized use of another citizen’s patented
invention, this is deemed infringement, an action historically sounding in tort, not

* © Sean M. O’Connor 2012. Visiting Professor of Law (2012-2013), The George Washington
University Law School; Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Law, Business & Entrepreneurship
Program, University of Washington School of Law (soconnor@uw.edu). The Author wishes to thank
Carly Chan and Rhys Lawson for invaluable research assistance on earlier drafts of this paper, the
University of Washington School of Law and its Gallagher Law Library for generous research
support, and the editors of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their careful
editing. All errors are the Author’s alone.
1 See, e.g., Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 308 (1912). (noting that, in
light of the United States government’s eminent domain power, an “injunction could rightfully only
have been made to operate until the United States had appropriated the right to use the patented
inventions”).
2 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that
28 U.S.C. § 1492(a) (2012) partially abrogates the U.S. government’s sovereign immunity for
particular acts of patent infringement).
3 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 5–6 (Robert
C. Clark, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004) (explaining that patent and other intellectual property rights differ
from traditional forms of property in the sense that knowledge and ideas are non-excludable and
non-exhaustible).
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property.4 No misappropriation of property has occurred under the law, but rather
an infringement of rights.
This puzzle can be resolved by examining the exact nature of the patent grant in
the United States. Crucially, the core right granted with the patent is the “negative”
right to exclude others from practicing the patentee’s invention as claimed in the
patent.5 In detail, the patentee obtains:
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into
the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States,
or importing into the United States, products made by that process . . . .6
This is a negative right because it does not give the patentee any positive right
to practice the patented technology herself.7 This makes sense for two reasons.
First, we may not want the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to issue positive
rights to practice patented technologies because this could conflict with other
government interests in regulating technologies, such as the requirement that the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approve new pharmaceuticals before they
may be distributed in the market.8 Second, the grant of a positive right to practice
an invention would be somewhat redundant.9

4 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1894) (finding that a wrongful use of a
patent action sounded in tort, and thus was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims);
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 33 (1931); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
5 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (noting that under the Patent Act of 1952, “a patent grants the patentee the right to
exclude others”).
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
7 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.
8 See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5. Consider the explanation of the patent right to exclude
given by Giles S. Rich—later Judge Rich—while lecturing at Columbia Law School:

Postulate that there is not now and never was a patent system. A person makes
an invention. Assuming there is no law prohibiting it, can he make it? Can he
use it? Can he sell it? Yes. Without a patent, he has all these rights. Now let’s
write down (on the blackboard) what the statute says the patent grants the
inventor:
A.

THE EXCLUSIVE

RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL

and write under it what rights he had without a patent:
B.

THE

RIGHT TO MAKE, USE, AND SELL

Now, let’s subtract B from A and see what the patent gave him
EXCLUSIVE
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Thus, the “property” established by the issued patent is not the invention itself,
but rather the exclusivity right.10 Contrast this with personal or real property rights
to use, as well as exclude others from using, the property.11 While a “right to
exclude” on its own may seem to be an odd sort of thing to consider property, consider
that options on stock or commodities are property as well—they can be bought and
sold—even though they are merely rights to take certain actions at a later date.
Consequently, the patent res should be thought of as a legal right that can be bought
and sold like other legal rights such as options or futures contracts.
At the same time, this right to exclude represents the only real commercial value
that an inventor can extract from her invention. This is a different proposition from
the obvious point that monopolies are almost always valuable to their holders. The
standard explanation for why intellectual property is different, and should be treated
differently from other forms of property is summed up with the oft-cited Jefferson
quote that “[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening
me.”12 This, however, seems to be a peculiar and overly limited view of inventions.
Assuming the first person in the Jefferson quote is the inventor, there is a loss to the
inventor when others use her invention. While it is true that, on one level, many
persons can simultaneously use and benefit from an invention, on another level, none
has any more of an advantage over the others than he did before the use of the
invention by all. Accordingly, an invention’s real value to an inventor is the ability to
use it exclusively, and in doing so gain a commercial advantage over her neighbors.13
For example, an invention for a more efficient process for spinning wool will allow the

Every business man knows what it means to “have the exclusive” on something.
What he gets from the patent—and all he gets—is a right to exclude. That’s the
patent right.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Judge Rich’s lecture notes from Columbia Law School). Judge
Rich was a patent attorney before becoming one of the prime architects of the 1952 Patent Act (still
the basis for the current patent law codified in the United States Code). Id. at 24. Later, Rich was
appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and then to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit when that court was created in 1982. Id.
10 Id. at 5; Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
11 Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment protects interests in real property, including “the right to possess, use and dispose” of
property, and that “property owners have the right to exclusive possession”).
12 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291–92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed. 1984). A more contemporary explanation is
that because inventions are nonrivalrous (to use the economists’ term) and can be used by many
simultaneously without lessening the value to each user, they differ from tangible forms of property
such as cars and land that cannot be fully possessed and used simultaneously by more than one
holder. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5–6.
13 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977) (“The patent is a reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from his
investment in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to
appropriation by others.”).
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inventor to produce more wool per cost expenditure than her neighbors, and thus, she
may gain a decided market advantage over them.
Of course, this sounds a lot like the rationale for trade secrets, which is
implicitly
embedded
in
the
definition
of
a
trade
secret:
“information . . . that . . . derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use . . . .”14 Yet, this measure of value is also appropriate for patentable inventions,
even though it does not appear in the definition of patents in a similar manner. In
fact, this reconceptualization of the value of inventions, patentable or otherwise,
actually gives a clearer and more compelling justification for a patent system than
the standard utilitarian or natural rights arguments,15 while only subtly, but
importantly, differing from the utilitarian one.16 The theory proposed in this Article
is most closely related to the dissemination incentive strain of utilitarian
justifications: The public’s proper concern is not so much that individuals will not
invent absent a formal reward or incentive system such as patents, but rather that
they will not distribute products embodying those inventions and may engage in
costly measures to maintain the secrecy of the invention.17 But, if this is all the
patent system is about, then why not pre-empt the trade secret system—as Congress
has clearly chosen not to do18—and set up a reward/incentive system so that all
commercially valuable inventions will be disseminated ultimately to the public?
In contrast, the proposed theory reconciles this problem by arguing that the
standard view of patentable inventions as somehow superior or more worthy than
those protected as mere trade secrets gets things exactly backwards.
The
dissemination problem is most acute for those valuable innovations that cannot be
maintained as trade secrets absent substantial—and wasteful—efforts to disguise
them in products or services distributed to the marketplace. Thus, these sorts of
innovations are less valuable to their inventors, absent a patent system, as a means
for gaining economic advantage over one’s neighbors, and are then less likely to be
used fully (or without wasteful exercises in subterfuge) than those that are
protectable under the sort of trade secret and unfair competition law that
significantly precedes formal patent systems. Accordingly, the problem is not really
about incentives to create or disclose, but rather simply incentive to use one’s
inventions in the normal stream of commerce.19 The patent system, in this view,
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 6, 38–54 (discussing utilitarian and natural rights
theories).
16 See id. at 49–51.
17 See id. at 68–70 (variously referring to the dissemination incentive as the “incentive to
commercialize,” “incentive to invest,” “incentive to innovate,” and “prospect theory”).
18 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 155–56 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (“Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the
wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.”).
19 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008) (discussing, in part, that innovators derive benefits from development and
use of inventions). Importantly, even if the system is best understood as an incentive to use one’s
invention, in the United States we have refrained from taking the further step of requiring use or
commercialization.
14
15
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recognizes the value of invention to its inventor as residing in its exclusive use and
establishes a legal fiction—the patent grant of exclusivity—to allow the patentee to
hold a legal right to that exclusivity even for inventions that would be easily
ascertainable when embodied in products placed in the stream of commerce.20
In this way, the patent grant is not the unnatural, lottery-like or
disproportionate reward/incentive structure that it is often held to be. Rather, it
simply creates a legal environment in which the commercial value to the inventor—
exclusivity—is maintained for a period of time by force of law so that the inventor
can exploit her resource in a similar manner to other resources that are more
“naturally” held in exclusive control, such as land or tangible objects.21 Further, this
right to exclude does not carry with it a concomitant obligation to use or
commercialize the invention both because there may be other legal or practical
impediments to such use and because important economic values have been tied to
the ability to time the distribution of one’s intellectual property products to events in
the marketplace.22 Of course, the invention will pass into the public domain at the
end of the patent term regardless of the inventor’s use, or lack thereof, during the
patent term,23 so one could simply say that it is the inventor’s own loss if she does not
exploit her invention at all during the exclusivity period.
Admittedly, there is a bit of “unnaturalness” to the patent grant under this
theory, in that it locks in exclusivity for some inventions, which, even if protectable
as trade secrets, might still fall into the public domain—through disclosure or reverse
engineering—in a time shorter than the patent term would be.24 But, this challenge
20

rights).

Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1913) (discussing exclusivity as one of the patent

21 Kitch, supra note 13, at 266. Edmund Kitch introduced the famous “prospect theory” of
patents by analogizing the patent system to mineral prospecting, id. at 267–71, and the patent grant
to the claim stake used by miners to mark off their prospecting area. Id. at 271–74. Like other
valuable resource sources such as fresh water springs and oil deposits, mineral deposit areas are
perfectly well understood to be susceptible to private ownership as demarcated by land ownership.
Id. Patent claims should be even less contentious as they do not remove anything from the
commons (as arguably mining claim stakes do) and are restricted to new and nonobvious inventions
that are not already part of the common knowledge. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012). Further, like
mining stake claims, there is no guarantee that any value or profit will flow from patent grants—
patents rarely embody the entire product as sold to the public and, thus, require much development
above and beyond the patent claims before revenues can flow. Kitch, supra note 13, at 276–77; F.
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV.
697, 707–12 (2001). Thus, the strain of the dissemination incentive justification for patents that
most closely aligns with the views of this Article, although not identically, is the commercialization
theory as characterized by the view of patents as a coordinating mechanism to bring together all of
the necessary players—not just inventors, but also venture capitalists, manufacturers, etc.—
involved in commercializing new technologies. See Kieff, supra; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–
70; Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177–80 (1942);
22 See Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584–85 (6th Cir. 1911).
23 35 U.S.C. § 154.
At the same time, in the current environment where companies are
building enormous patent portfolios for both offensive and defensive purposes—in some cases
essentially warehousing many of these patents—one could argue that it is time to rethink the lack of
a use or working requirement in the U.S. system.
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (granting a patent term of twenty years from date on which the
patent application was filed). In fact, holding aside the formula for Coca-Cola, many trade secrets
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is not fatal for the proposed theory. Instead, it actually helps explain the limitations
on patents. First, we want to err on the side of not granting patents to things that
are already known or obvious, and so we construct strict bars for novelty and
nonobviousness.25 Second, we assume that secret inventions used in commerce will
become known sooner or later,26 and thus, we limit the time period for the legal right
to exclusivity.27
Having now (re)established exactly what the patent grant is—simply the quasicontractual right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a certain
invention—we can see that any unauthorized use of the invention has effectively
destroyed the entirety of that right.28 Coupled with the establishment of this legal
right as a res of property, similar to other contractual rights that can be traded, such
as options of futures, the patent grant stands as a piece of private property that must
be considered to have been taken, for Fifth Amendment purposes, whenever the
government engages in any unauthorized use of the invention.29 This would include
any “making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by
that process . . . .”30
Even the narrowest use by the government without
authorization should be deemed a taking because it destroys the only right the
patentee has—the right to exclude others.
Notwithstanding, many courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, have ruled that unauthorized use by the government does not constitute a
“taking” in the traditional sense because of what is often called the “Government Use
Statute,”31 which is a statutory provision authorizing such use with the only recourse
for the patent owner being a suit for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims.32
This statute is conceptually similar to the old “Crown Right” of the British
government.33
The difference is that the U.S. government has to pay fair
compensation for the use, whereas under the old British Crown Right, the British
government had no such obligation.34 Throughout the nineteenth century, the

do seem to find their way into the public domain sooner or later. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The
Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic
Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 868 (2002) (“The ‘leaky’ nature of trade secrets means that
secret information often eventually enters the public domain . . . .”).
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a).
26 See Moohr, supra note 24.
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
28 35 U.S.C. § 271.
29 See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
30 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
31 See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 627 F.3d 1309, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Leesona
Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 979 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
33 See United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270 (1888).
34 See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 15 (1896). Of note, the current statutory version of the
British Crown Right does require fair compensation to the patent owner. Patents Act, 1977, c. 37,
§ 57A (U.K.).
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Supreme Court consistently rejected the notion that the U.S. government had such a
power to use a patent without compensation.35
This rejection of the Crown Rights doctrine, originating in cases of government
employee inventions, set off a cascade of other legal issues. Did the government have
a right to own, or even use, employee or military personnel inventions without an
assignment or license? Did the government have any rights to practice patented
inventions held by purely private citizens? If it did, could that right be extended to
contractors working for the government? Who should own inventions developed by
such contractors on projects for the government?
And finally, should the
determination of ownership rights as between the government and the contractor for
federally funded inventions affect the ownership rights of inventors employed by the
contractor? These questions were all logical extensions of the thorny central issues of
Crown Rights, compulsory licenses, and agency theories.36
To a large extent, the three main issues—government employee invention
use/title, government contractor and contractor employee invention use/title, and
government use of private patents—were addressed by legislation, case law, and
executive policy developments in the mid-twentieth century.37 But, not all the
complications were resolved. In fact, fairly fundamental issues were left open, such
as how title or use rights of government contractor employee inventions should be
secured, and whether fact patterns falling outside of the technical boundaries of the
Government Use Statute would enable the patent owner to sue the government for a
taking.38 These have come to the fore as of late and are being addressed, to some
degree, by recent court decisions in Stanford v. Roche39 and Zoltek Corp. v. United
States40 However, the unifying deeper questions of these seemingly disparate cases
have not been tied together. This Article, then, sets the missing groundwork to show
that the original questions about how the government stood vis-a-vis its employees,
See, e.g., Belknap, 161 U.S. at 15; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
See, e.g., Belknap, 161 U.S. at 15–22.
37 See, e.g., Kessenich v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 528, 531–32 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Strategical
Demolition Torpedo Co., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 264 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Stub v. United States,
119 F. Supp. 206 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S.
290, 305 (1912); Memorandum of October 10, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963) [hereinafter
Kennedy Patent Policy].
38 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011). The Court explained that the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 did not automatically
vest title in government contractor inventions to the U.S. government, and that “[n]owhere in the
Act is title expressly vested in contractors or anyone else; nowhere in the Act are inventors expressly
deprived of their interest in federally funded inventions.” Id. Instead, the statute provided that
“contractors may ‘elect to retain title to any subject invention.’” Id. As for the issue of whether a
patent owner may sue the government for a taking for fact patterns outside the Government Use
Statue, the court in Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
recounted the “saga of Zoltek Corporation” and the considerable confusion regarding the proper
forum for suit when a private patent holder’s rights have allegedly been infringed in a foreign
jurisdiction by a U.S. government contractor who then imports the allegedly infringing product back
into the United States for sale and use.
39 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188
(2011).
40 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
35
36
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contractors, and the patent system itself are still at issue in these current cases.
Part I establishes the context and details of the early judicial debates over whether
government use of patented inventions without an express license or assignment was
a taking, tort, quasi or implied contact, or form of Crown Right. Part II traces the
statutory and judicial attempts at resolving these issues in the pre-war ,early
twentieth century. Part III then outlines, in brief, the post-war, mid-twentieth
century statutory and executive branch policies that form the basis for modern
government patent policy.
I. THE TORT, TAKING, AND CROWN RIGHT DEBATES IN THE EARLY U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
A look back at the early history of the patent system and the government’s use of
patented technologies gives concrete examples and support to the foregoing
theorizing, even as it adds a new layer of complexity. The Patent Act of 1790, the
first federal patent statute, was silent as to whether patents were property, but also
seemed to give both negative and positive rights to the patented invention.41 The
penalties for unauthorized infringement under this Act were forfeiture of the
infringing goods and damages.42 The 1790 Act was quickly repealed and replaced by
the Patent Act of 1793,43 which primarily switched the U.S. patent system from one
based on intensive examination—by a panel consisting of the Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney General—to one based merely
upon registration with the Secretary of State.44 This Act retained the positive and
negative rights grant of the 1790 Act,45 but also established the possibility of blocking
improvement patents,46 and, arguably, established an early version of the doctrine of
equivalents.47 Of particular interest for this Article, the 1793 Act also expressly
authorized the assignability of patents with a requirement for recordation with the
Secretary of State.48
41 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (granting to inventors “for any term not
exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and
vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery”). It is not clear whether the
implications of this positive grant—or “liberty”—to practice the invention was understood to then
preempt or supersede any other legal limitations on such practice. However, see infra for a
discussion of whether this and subsequent Acts with similar language were actually interpreted to
give a positive right to practice the invention, rather than solely the negative right as is clearly the
case under the current law.
42 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 111.
43 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21.
44 Compare Patent Act of 1790 ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat 109, 109, with Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1
Stat 318, 318–21.
45 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21.
46 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 321 (“That any person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the
principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have been
patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make,
use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the
improvement . . . .”).
47 Id. (“And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the form or the proportions
of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.”).
48 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 322.
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At the same time, it seems clear that only natural persons could obtain patents
as inventors under both the 1790 and 1793 Acts, based on the requirements that the
patent petitioner (today called the applicant) be the original and true inventor and
the pronoun references to “he” or “they,” but never “it” for such petitioners.49 Thus,
there was not then, and is not now, the possibility for “corporate inventors” in the
same way that there can be “corporate authors” under the work for hire doctrine of
the Copyright Act.50 The 1793 Act also restricted remedies for infringement to
damages, not including forfeiture of infringing goods, but raised damages to “a sum,
that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention[.]”51
Neither the 1790 nor 1793 Acts made any provision regarding government use of
privately owned patents.52 Further, no cases seem to have arisen where a patentee
sued the federal government for unauthorized use of his/her patents. The earliest,
accessible reference to any government acquisition of patent rights is an 1812 act of
Congress “to purchase of Winslow Lewis, his patent right to the new and improved
method of lighting Lighthouses, and for other purposes.”53 This is a fascinating piece
of legislation for a few reasons: first, that it would take an act of Congress, albeit a
private act, just for the government to avail itself of someone’s patent rights; second,
that it includes authorization to contract with Lewis to run the upkeep operation as
well;54 and third that $60,000—in 1812—was appropriated by Congress for this
plan.55 While not conclusive evidence, this act seems to justify an inference that the
U.S. government did not believe that it could simply take a license, under an eminent
domain theory or otherwise, to a private citizen’s patent. Instead, it seemed to
simply approach the situation as if it were any other private party that would need to
negotiate with the patentee to obtain any rights to practice the invention.
The next major patent legislation was the Patent Act of 1836,56 which repealed
and replaced the 1793 Act.57 The 1836 Act reinstated the examination system (but
through a system of clerks this time),58 and allowed a court to impose a range of
damages starting at the actual amount and proceeding up to a maximum of treble
damages.59 But, it seemed to have had no effect on the federal government’s ability,
or perception of its ability, to take unauthorized licenses, even for munitions related
patents. For example, Congress passed legislation on the same day that it passed the
1836 Act authorizing a purchase of two patents from one Captain William H. Bell:
the first for “a machine for elevating heavy cannon,” and the second for “a traverse

Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 318–21.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). Copyright law still allows for the separation of owners and
authors regarding copyrights, id. § 201(d), just as patent law provides for a distinction between
inventors and owners under the assignment doctrine. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
51 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322.
52 Patent Act of 1790 ch. 7, 1 Stat 109, 109–12; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23.
53 Act of March 2, 1812, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 691, 691.
54 Id.
55 Id. § 2.
56 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25.
57 Id. § 21, 5 Stat. at 125.
58 Id. § 2, 5 Stat. at 118.
59 Id. § 14, 5 Stat. at 123.
49
50
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board for pointing cannon.”60 Congress also wisely included a right for the U.S. to
use “every improvement that has been made by said Bell on the said inventions,
since patenting the same . . . .”61 The grand total for this purchase was to be
$20,000.62
Likewise, ten years later, the federal government seems to have still been
relying on this cumbersome method to acquire rights to privately held patents.63 On
August 8, 1846 Congress enacted legislation:
That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized to
purchase of Mrs. Ann Mix, widow of M. P. Mix, late master
commandant in the navy, the unlimited power to use a machine
called a “manger-stopper,” in all ships of war or other vessels
belonging to the United States: Provided, An assignment thereof can
be obtained at a cost not exceeding three thousand dollars, which sum
is hereby appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the treasury
not otherwise appropriated.64
Another fascinating part of these last two Congressional appropriations is that both
seem to be authorizing purchases of patents obtained by military men, and in the last
case, the patent was for naval technology likely developed by Mr. Mix while still
employed by the U.S. Navy.65 If this is true, then it would appear that government
agencies such as the Navy, under the then Department of War, were not even
requiring the assignment of patentable inventions by employees.66 Yet, at the same
time, the government was finding that it needed some of these patented
technologies—both those developed completely by outsiders, as well as those invented
and patented by the government’s own employees.67
Nearly a decade later, Congress passed the first act creating the Court of Claims
(the predecessor to the Court of Federal Claims) to “hear and determine all claims
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the
United States . . . .”68 In 1863, the Court of Claims’ authority was extended to
include “all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or
unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever, on the part of the government, against
any person making claim against the government in said court.”69

Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 360, 5 Stat. 126, 126.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 169, 9 Stat. 82, 82.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. Of course, it is possible that Mr. Mix had in fact left the service before inventing and
patenting the manger-stopper, or that he had not developed it as part of his regular duties.
67 See e.g., Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 360, 5 Stat. 126; Act of Aug. 8, 1846, ch. 169, 9 Stat. 82.
68 See Clyde v. United States, 80 U.S. 38, 39 (1871) (quoting Patent Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10
Stat. 612, 612).
69 See Ex parte Zellner, 76 U.S. 244, 244 (1869) (quoting Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 3, 12
Stat. 765, 765).
60
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In that same year, what appears to be the first case brought against the United
States for patent infringement was brought before the Court of Claims.70 In Pitcher
v. United States (“Pitcher’s Case”),71 the warden of the U.S. penitentiary for the
District of Columbia had inmates using the patented broom making machine of one
Spencer Rowe to manufacture brooms, which were then sold with the proceeds going
to the maintenance and support of the penitentiary.72 While the warden had duly
entered into an agreement with Rowe to erect and operate them with inmate labor,
Rowe had earlier assigned all his interest in the patent to one John Fox, who in turn
had assigned it to C. A. Pitcher, the claimant.73 Pitcher then based his claim against
the U.S. on an interesting twist, necessitated by the limited jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims: Even though the same fact pattern as between two private individuals
would lead only to a tort claim—or “action on the case”74—of patent infringement, the
United States is a body politic that is incapable of committing tortious acts.
Therefore, it must enter into an implied contract with patent holders when it uses
their patents without authorization.75 Consequently, the patent owner should be
allowed to waive the tort and bring an action based on assumpsit and the implied
contract.76 This, of course, then allows the patent owner to bring the claim within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. For good measure, Pitcher also added a
takings claim and argued that this too gave rise to an implied contract to compensate
him for the taking.77
The court was unimpressed by these arguments, and denied that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case.78 First, it rejected the takings claim because of both the
nature of the thing alleged to have been taken and the manner in which it occurred.79
As to the latter, “[w]e cannot believe that the framers of this clause intended that
every subordinate officer or petty agent of the United States might undertake to
decide for himself when the exigency has occurred, or the necessity exists, for the
seizure and appropriation of the property of the citizen.”80 This argument that there
70 Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863). Of course, the basis for such suits may have
existed much earlier, but perhaps owing simply to a lack of a proper forum, on the one hand, and
sovereign immunity principles, on the other, any earlier claims against the U.S. may simply have
not been able to be heard in any court of law.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 7–8.
73 Id. at 7.
74 Act of July. 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (establishing that “damages may be
recovered by action on the case in any court of competent jurisdiction”).
75 Pitcher, 1 Ct. Cl. at 8–9. While this appears to have been a novel argument in this case, it
was formally stated as a point of law, albeit as between a citizen of one country and agents of a
government of another, by the Court of Claims two years later in Straughan v. United States, 1 Ct.
Cl. 324 (1865). The Court plainly stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a tort by a government
against an individual.” Id. at 328. It went on to state that “[a]s between a citizen and his own
government, acts which between private persons would be torts are to be deemed implied contracts
founded on the right of eminent domain, or else acts unavoidable, and necessary for the public
welfare, but never acts founded upon a wrongful or malicious intent.” Id. at 328–29.
76 Pitcher, 1 Ct. Cl. at 8–9.
77 Id. at 9.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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needs to be a suitably high or formal level of authorization for a taking to be held to
have occurred reappears in later cases of unauthorized patent use by the government
throughout the 1800s.81 Where such authorization does not exist, then the action by
the government agent or officer “is a simple trespass, for which he is amenable to the
law, . . . .”82 The court also asserted that there just “was no seizure or taking of any
tangible property belonging to the claimant; at most it was a mistaken and
unauthorized use of a machine which he had an exclusive right to make, use, and
vend.”83 “It was the disturbance or infringement of his right, instead of the caption of
his property.” 84
Second, the court pointed out that the patent law itself prescribes both the form
of action and proper forums for patent owners seeking remedy for unauthorized use
of their patents.85 Neither of these had been availed of by the claimant in this case.
Finally, the court dispensed of the implied contact argument, at least based on the
facts of the case:
We will not affirm that no case can arise where this principle would be
sustained; but we think we are safe in saying that the doctrine of implied
contract does not arise in any case out of the acts of an agent who has no
power or authority to make an express one.86
However, there was one additional wrinkle asserted by the claimant:
[I]t is contended that [the implied contract] arises not so much from the
wrongful acts of the agents or officers of the United States as from the
receipt of the proceeds or profits of the use of the machine; and that having
received these profits from the wrongful use of the machine, the claimant
may waive the tort, and sue as for money had and received to his use.87
The court accepted that there were cases where tortious conversion of property
occurred and the owner was then able to waive the tort and bring an action in
indebitadus assumpsit to recover the money “had and received” by the tortious
actions.88 But, it stated that in the case of a patented machine, “it is the machine
itself and not its product that is protected by the letters patent.”89 Thus, the brooms
manufactured by the machines “were simply and exclusively the property of the
United States” and consequently the injury sustained by the claimant “was not the
sale and conversion of his brooms, but the unauthorized use of his invention in
making them.”90 Again, the court called attention to the type of action and forums
See infra.
Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7, 9 (1863).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 9.
85 Id. at 10.
86 Id. at 11.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis omitted).
90 Id. at 11–12.
81
82
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prescribed by the patent statute, and ultimately held that its jurisdiction did not
extend to this case.91
What is not fully explored in Pitcher’s Case is whether the warden believed that
he was acting under proper authorization of the patent owner when he installed and
used the broom machines under contract with the original patentee, Rowe. If so,
then this would not be the best fact pattern for determining the liability of the
government for intentional unauthorized use of patents, but rather only a test of
accidental or negligent unauthorized use. Pitcher’s Case does, however, lay some
groundwork for the substantial problem of determining damages when the
government infringes a patent because the government is usually perceived as not
acting as a commercial entity and, so, measures such as profits are difficult to assess.
A few years after Pitcher’s Case, Burns v. United States (“Burn’s Case”)92
affirmed that patent owners’ licenses to the government are valid and may not be
disregarded by the government.93 In particular, Captain (later Major) Burns received
an assignment of one-half interest in a patent for a conical tent from the patentee,
one Major Sibley.94 Both were then officers in the U.S. Army, but Sibley afterwards
defected and joined the Confederate Army as the Civil War ensued.95 While still
commissioned with the U.S. Army, Sibley negotiated a license with the Army to
produce the patented tents upon royalties of $5 per tent.96 After he defected, the
Army determined that Major Burns should still be paid one-half of this royalty, even
as it ceased paying Sibley.97 After paying Burns this partial royalty on a number of
tents, the Army began withholding payments based on an interpretation of Army
Regulation 1002, which forbade military officers and agents from purchasing or
contracting for military goods and services with other military officers and agents.98
Clearly, 1002 intended to limit favoritism and cronyism in military procurement, but
the court recognized that the military would almost certainly need to contract
occasionally with its officers and agents in the context of military procurement.99
The court held that the Secretary of War was a civilian officer rather than a military
officer, and thus, contracts he approved fell outside of 1002.100 Because the Secretary
of War approved Sibley’s original license, it too fell outside of 1002.101
At the same time, the Army continued making and using the patented tents.
The court held that the former’s withholding of royalty payments to Burns was

91 Id. at 12. The court does state in dicta that the remedies available under the patent statute
are “appropriate and ample, and those courts open to the claimant . . . .” Id. But, the availability of
the federal circuit courts for patent infringement actions against government agents and officers
who acted within their official duties is in fact challenged in the first case in which it arises. See
infra.
92 Burns v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 113 (1868).
93 Id. at 116.
94 Id. at 114.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 115.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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insufficient grounds to find that the Army had terminated the license.102 This last
point was crucial because it kept the matter within the context of an express
contract, actionable in the Court of Claims. By contrast, the Army had argued that it
had terminated the contract, and so any further making or using of the patented tent
was a tortious activity outside of the court’s jurisdiction.103 However, the court
strongly suggested that it should not be presumed that the Secretary “intended to
violate the law and disregard the rights secured by the patent, [even while] it is
certain that he could not commit the United States to any such wrongful
procedure.”104 The Secretary must not have been too pleased with the Army’s
attempt to paint him as a tortfeasor. Alternatively, based on the court’s own
comments in Pitcher’s Case, would not the Secretary have been a high enough
authority in the government to direct a taking of the patent? Whether it was
intentional or not, the court seemed to duck this explanation for the Secretary’s
actions.105
While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress had already
decided it was time to compile the sundry amendments to the Patent Act of 1836 that
had been accumulating.106 Thus, the Patent Act was once again repealed and
replaced by the Patent Act of 1870.107 For our purposes, the two major changes were
to the patent grant itself, and the explicit authorization of injunctive relief in
appropriate cases of infringement. The patent grant language in the 1870 Act
dropped the confusing reference to “liberties” in earlier Acts that seemed to give a
positive right to practice the invention.108 The new language instead established a
“grant to the patentee, . . . for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the said invention or discovery . . . .”109 This language was still
not as crisp on the nature of the patent grant as the 1952 Act, but it certainly seems
closer to, and was interpreted as, simply granting a right to exclude.110 For example,
Id. at 116.
Id. at 126.
104 Id. The court continued to offer an alternate explanation: the Secretary had merely ceased
the payments in case the courts determined that the contract with Sibley was invalid under the
Regulation; payment could always be made later upon proper interpretation of the Regulation by the
courts. Id.
105 Id. But neither party seemed to raise the issue anyway, likely with good reason as it would
not have helped either’s case.
106 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217.
107 Id.
108 Id.; see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (suggesting that, even under the
Patent Act of 1836, the patentee did not have a liberty to use the patent, but rather only to exclude
others). The Supreme Court considered the nature of the patent grant under the 1836 Act, as
amended, and gave a description of that grant that is very much in line with Judge Rich’s analysis
of the contemporary patent right: “The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the
right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the
permission of the patentee. That is all that he obtains by the patent.” Id. Accordingly, even the
earlier patent acts may not have in fact been granting positive rights to practice the invention.
109 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
110 Compare Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (granting “the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the said invention”), with Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154, 66
Stat. 792, 804 (granting “the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention”).
Judge (then attorney) Rich in fact seems to have been using the language of the 1870 Act—which
102
103
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the use of a conjunction makes it sound as if the exclusive right was just directed to
the exercise of all three tasks together—making, using, and selling—and not on each
task as performed separately.111 The 1952 Act fixed this by changing the list to a
disjunctive one.112
Therefore, by 1870 the clear contours of the modern patent grant were firmly
established—although there was still no explicit reference to the property status of
patents—and remedies for both damages and injunctions were available.113 At the
same time, questions about the status of patents arising from government activities
as well as government use of the same, or even of purely private sector derived
patents, were increasing.114 This increase may have been based, in part, on the
increasing pace of technological innovation generally in the United States, including
the particular drive for war related technology associated with the Civil War’s
subsequent reputation as the first modern war.115
In December of that same year, the Supreme Court issued decisions in both
United States v. Burns116 and Seymour v. Osborne.117 Affirming the Court of Claims
in Burns, the Supreme Court added an interesting extra fillip. In explaining its
affirmance of the lower court’s ruling that the War Department, under the
Secretary’s authorization, can enter into contracts with servicemen notwithstanding
Regulation 1002, the Court commented on the ability of such servicemen to obtain
patents on military equipment:
If an officer in the military service, not specially employed to make
experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and
valuable improvement in arms, tents, or any other kind of war material, he
is entitled to the benefit of it, and to letters-patent for the improvement
from the United States, equally with any other citizen not engaged in such
service; and the government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of
the improvement any more than a private individual, without license of the
inventor or making compensation to him.118

largely remained in place until the 1952 Act repealed and replaced it—in his Columbia lecture
notes. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
111 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
112 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (“Every patent shall
contain . . . a grant . . . for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention . . . .”).
113 Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1876) (explaining the remedies that existed in
equity and damages prior to the Patent Act of 1870).
114 Most notably, questions of whether use of patents by the government were subject to
compensation under the Takings Clause. Accord Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234–35 (1876)
(concluding that patents are property for the purpose of Takings Clause analysis); McKeever v.
United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 422 (1878) (quoting Cammeyer).
115 ANDREW P. MORRISS & CRAIG ALLEN NARD, INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE & INTEREST GROUPS IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PATENT LAW: 1790-1870, at 65 (2008).
116 United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246, 246 (1870).
117 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 516 (1870).
118 Burns, 79 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
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This comment would later be cited for the proposition that the United States would
not follow the English precedent of a Crown Right to practice all patents issued in
that country.119 At the same time, it left open the government’s right to contract with
employees to invent and then assign those inventions to the government, just as was
the practice developing in the private sector.120 In Seymour, Justice Clifford, writing
for the majority, established the patent grant as a property right, notwithstanding
that the Patent Act of 1870 did not expressly support this: “Inventions secured by
letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much
entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term
for which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted.”121
The consequence of this propertization of the patent grant for government use of
patented inventions would not become fully clear until six years later. Justice
Clifford, sitting as Circuit Justice for the District of Massachusetts in Brady v.
Atlantic Works, rejected in dicta any right for the government to use patented
inventions without authorization or compensation except in the most dire of
circumstances.122 The issue was again, whether the government had any sort of
Crown Right to use a patented invention, but in this case, the question extended to a
contractor of the government.123 Atlantic Works was building ships for the

119 See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270 (1888) (“It was . . . doubted whether the
government might not be entitled to the use and benefit of every patented invention, by analogy to
the English law, which reserves this right to the crown. But that notion no longer exists. It was
ignored in the Case of Burns.”).
120 Id. Oddly though, the related doctrine of “shop rights”, or nonexclusive licenses implied to
have been granted to employers where employees use their facilities to invent, was not mentioned as
an alternate possible justification for a U.S. government right to practice Sibley’s patent without
compensation (to Burns), even though a case involving a similar circumstance in the private sector
had already been upheld in an 1843 Supreme Court decision. In McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202
(1843), the defendants had employed James Harley in their foundry where he subsequently invented
an improved machine for manufacturing metal rollers. Id. at 205. Harley received a raise in pay for
these efforts and allowed his employer to use the modified machines – indeed the machines appear
to have been made only because of the defendant’s contribution of resources for the purpose. Id.
Harley at one point suggested that he would patent the invention if the defendants would then
purchase it from him, but they declined. Id. He later patented the improvement anyway, and
assigned it to the plaintiffs in this case instead. Id. Afterwards, Harley left the defendants’ employ
because of a disagreement on a different matter, while the defendants continued using his patented
improved machines. Id. Plaintiffs then brought a patent infringement action in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which found for the defendants on an
implied license theory. Id. at 205–6. The Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of error and
affirmed the lower court’s decision. Id. at 211. But whereas the Circuit Court only granted a
nonexclusive license to the defendants, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the facts of the
case could have supported a finding that enough public use of the improved machines had occurred
before the patent application such that the patent should be held invalid. Id. at 208. However, the
court was of course restrained by the record developed by the lower courts, and the arguments of the
parties therein, and could only affirm the finding of an implied license. See id. It is interesting that
the Court nonetheless appeared to consider the nonexclusive “shop right” type of license to be a
variation on the public use grounds for denying or invalidating a patent.
121 Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533.
122 Brady v. Atl. Works, 3 F. Cas. 1190, 1192 (C.C.D. Ma. 1876) (No. 1794) rev’d on other
grounds, 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
123 Id. at 1193.
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government and, in doing so, allegedly infringing the patent of Brady.124 One of its
defenses was that it was acting as the “mere instrument” of the government as the
latter endeavored to build ships for its navy.125 This may have been the first time
that a contractor expressly sought to clothe itself as an agent of the government for
purposes of shielding itself from infringement liability. But, the court did not reach
that issue, as it rejected Atlantic Works’ threshold argument that the government
had reserved for itself a kind of Crown Right in any event.126 Justice Clifford
expressly rejected the applicability of continuing British case law on this matter—
specifically Feather v. Queen.127 Implicitly adopting the position that patents are not
any species of monopoly in the United States, he stated that “[p]atents in that
country are monopolies, granted by the sovereign, and may be granted or refused in
the royal discretion.”128 By contrast, “[p]ower to legislate upon the subject in this
country is conferred upon congress by the constitution, by securing for limited
periods to inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries.”129 Under the Patent
Act of 1870, the use of “[l]anguage so explicit and unambiguous admits of no
exception, even if it would be competent for congress to reserve such a right to the
government.”130 The opinion cited both Burns and the Patent Act of 1870 in support
of these propositions. It did, however, leave open the possibility for a limited
sovereign power to use a privately held patent with neither authority nor
compensation “in cases of extreme necessity, in time of war, and of immediate and
impending public danger.”131 But, none of those scenarios were found to apply in the
Brady facts,132 despite Atlantic Works’ arguments that this was essentially a suit
against the government of the kind that could stop the operations of the government
in times of both war and peace.133
Also in 1876, Justice Clifford wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court in
Cammeyer v. Newton.134 Nominally, like Brady, this appeared to be an infringement
case between private parties in which one of the defenses was that the work had been
done for the government. However, in this case, it was literally true as Newton and
the other respondents were engineers directly employed by the government.135 While
the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the defendants, it was on the
grounds of no infringement.136 Yet in dicta, Justice Clifford set the tone of cases to
come in which government employees would find themselves potentially liable to
damages or injunctions for infringing activities done in the course of their
employment:

Id. at 1191.
Id.
126 Id. at 1194.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. (emphasis added).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1192.
132 Id. at 1194.
133 Id. at 1191.
134 Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1876).
135 Id. at 234.
136 Id. at 236–38.
124
125
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Public employment is no defence to the employé for having converted the
private property of another to the public use without his consent and
without just compensation. Private property, the Constitution provides,
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; and it is clear
that that provision is as applicable to the government as to individuals,
except in cases of extreme necessity in time of war and of immediate and
impending public danger.
....
Agents of the public have no more right to take such private property than
other individuals under that provision, as it contains no exception
warranting any such invasion of the private rights of individuals.
Conclusive support to that proposition is found in a recent decision of this
court, in which it is held that the government cannot, after the patent is
issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual,
without license of the inventor or making him compensation.137
Two years later, yet another similar case came in front of the Court of Claims in
McKeever v. United States.138 This time, however, the patentee plaintiff was a
government employee, specifically a first lieutenant in the Second U.S. Infantry who
had invented a new kind of bullet cartridge box for soldiers to wear.139 So, this case
once again combined the question of whether the government should own or have
rights to inventions of its employees, as the government appears to have believed
leading up to this case,140 with the question of whether the government has any kind
of Crown Right, which the government then specifically argued in the case.141 The
government relied on the British cases of Feather v. The Queen142 and Dixon v. The
137 Id. at 234–35. (citations omitted). The potential carve out for “cases of extreme necessity in
time of war and of immediate and impending public danger” was almost certainly a nod to United
States v. Russell. 80 U.S. 623 (1871). In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims
holding that fair compensation was warranted where military officers commandeered steamships for
emergency purposes on the Mississippi River during the Civil War. Id. at 629. The Court found
that the crews of the steamships had assented, creating an implied contract which brought the
matter properly into the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and not some kind of “appropriation”
taking as would be outside that jurisdiction. Id. at 630. The case would be cited in later decisions
finding implied licenses for government use of patented inventions, even in the absence of an
express contract. See, e.g., United States v. Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 569 (1895).
138 McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878).
The case is reported to have been
affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal in the Supreme Court’s decision in Russell v. United
States, 182 U.S. 516, 531 (1901) (“M’Keever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, [was] affirmed on appeal
by this court . . . .”).
139 McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 397.
140 Id. at 403.
The court reporter stated that the facts of the case as found by the court
included that “[t]he board on infantry equipments, which recommended [McKeever’s] invention . . . ,
acted in the belief, derived from their own impressions of the law, that the government would not be
put to the additional expense of royalty for the use of an invention made by an officer of the Army.”
Id.
141 Id. at 418.
142 Id. at 417; Feather v. The Queen, (1865) 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Q.B.).
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London Small Arms Company.143 The court, acknowledging that such may be the
law of England, then went into an extended review (for a case such as this) of the
history of the British patent system up through the controversy leading to the
Statute of Monopolies.144 It did so to show the background of the “obnoxious patents”
that both triggered that Statute and lead to the antipathy in the United States
towards patents as discretionary prerogatives or privileges of the sovereign which
can be granted as matters of grace or favor and not of right:
In this country, on the contrary, our organic law recognizes in the clearest
terms that mind-work which we term inventions. . . . Instead of placing our
patent system upon the English foundation of executive favor and
conferring that prerogative of the Crown upon the President, they
transferred all authority to the legislative department of the government
(the department which regulates rights), by placing it among the specially
enumerated powers of Congress.
....
. . . Congress are not empowered to grant to inventors a favor, but to secure
to them a right. And the term “to secure a right” by no possible implication
carries with it the opposite power of destroying the right in whole or in part
by appropriating it to the purposes of government without complying with
that other condition of the Constitution, the making of “just compensation.”
Neither does the term “the exclusive right” admit of an implication that with
regard to such patentable articles as the government may need the right
shall not be exclusive. The transfer of the power from the executive to the
legislature; the abandonment of the terms “grant” and “patent”; the
substitution of the words “secure,” “right,” and “exclusive”; the absence of an
express reservation which at common law attaches to favors of the Crown or
is inferable from the terms “grant” and “patent,” are facts which combine to
demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution designed to place the work
of the inventor among legal rights, which, when properly “secured” in a
manner to be provided by law, should become property in the eye of the law
and be respected as such by the government as by the citizen.
Pursuant to the plain intent of the Constitution, Congress have never
sought to attach such a condition to the issuing of a patent; private acts
have been passed remitting claims for the use of patented inventions to this
court for adjudication; statutes have been enacted prohibiting or regulating
the use of patented articles in the government service (12 Stat. L., 91, 104,
§ 3; Rev. Stat., § 1537); appropriations have been made to pay inventors the
royalty justly due for their property thus taken for public use; the executive
departments have freely resorted to patented articles for the purposes of the
government, and have made them the subject of express contracts. The
143
144

McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 417; Dixon v. The London Small Arms Co., (1876) Q.B.D. 384 (Eng.).
McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 417–20.
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course of the legislature and the practice of the executive alike forbid the
assumption that this government has ever sought to appropriate the
property of the inventor, or that it has ever asserted an inherent right to do
so analogous to that reserved in Great Britain by the Crown.145
The government also argued that the use by government agents of McKeever’s
patented invention was either a tort or under a gratuitous license from McKeever.146
The court rejected these as “extreme views”:
When a vendible article, such as ordinarily is the subject of bargain and
sale, is offered by a producer to a consumer, though with no price specified,
and is accepted and used by the latter, it is not to be supposed, on the one
hand, that the offer was intended as a gift inter vivos, nor implied, on the
other, that the taking was with a tortious intent.147
It then recounted the events leading up to the government’s adoption and use of
McKeever’s cartridge boxes, including the facts that the military board had solicited
submissions of such items, that McKeever had complied with that process, that the
board had selected his design (albeit as somewhat modified by the government), and
that the government repeatedly referred to it as “your patent cartridge-boxes” and
similar descriptions.148 Anticipating later concerns of military defense contractors,
the court also addressed the issue of patented inventions that had essentially only
one purchaser, the government: “The claimant had gone to the expense of turning
his invention into property; it was an article salable almost exclusively to the
government; his offer imported a desire to sell to almost the only purchaser of such
articles . . . .”149
Finally, the government argued that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction
over patent cases because the Patent Act considered infringement a tort and placed
jurisdiction in the regular district courts, and not the Court of Claims.150 The court
rejected this because it considered the facts to show an implied license or contract
with the government, which was exclusively the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.151
The court further bolstered its position by contrasting the instant facts with those of
other cases where the aggrieved party had potential remedies in other venues.152
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 422–23.
The court gave an analogy to further underscore what it felt to be the
extreme nature of the defendant’s position:
If the Quarter-master-General had appointed a board to select a wood-lot for the
fuel of the army, and a farmer had written to him recommending his wood, and the board
had reported in favor of it, and the Quartermaster Department had proceeded to cut and
use the wood, can it be supposed that this would be deemed a tortious taking on the part
of the Quartermaster-General or a gratuitous license on the part of the farmer?
Id. at 423.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 423–24.
152 Id. at 424.
145
146
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Establishing what would become the central vexing issue for the question of patent
owner remedies against unauthorized government use, the court stated:
In the present case the claimant has confessedly no remedy in the circuit
court against the government, and is without a remedy to recover for his
property taken for public use, unless the act creating this court gives him
one. That act was passed long after the establishment of the patent system;
it is comprehensive in terms; it makes no exception either as regards the
kind of property which may be the subject of an implied contract or as
regards the jurisdiction of other courts over suits between ordinary
litigants. Where, as in this case, there is clearly an implied contract
between the government and the citizen; and the suit is brought entirely
upon that agreement, and the claimant is without judicial redress
elsewhere, we perceive no reason why we should engraft an exception upon
the statute which Congress have not placed there.153
Notwithstanding this forceful statement by Judge Nott in this case, the issue would
not be resolved so easily. Difficult fact patterns would arise in which it was less clear
whether the government had intended to engage in any kind of contract, express or
implied, with the patent owner. In such cases, the subject matter would fall outside
the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, and could most plausibly be argued as only the tort
of patent infringement, which in turn could not be alleged against the government.154
This would leave only the claim of a government taking. At the same time, the
question of whether the government should have ownership of, or at least a license
to, government employees’ inventions was likewise unresolved.
These matters returned to the Supreme Court in the 1881 Supreme Court case
of James v. Campbell,155 which involved the somewhat banal, although evidently
quite useful, patent for a double stamping mechanism that could be used to
simultaneously postmark and cancel the postage stamp on a letter.156 The assignee
of the patent brought suit in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York
directly against the United States Postmaster for the City of New York, Thomas
James, for infringing the patent by using a device alleged to embody it in the New
York post office.157 An earlier claim brought before the Court of Claims was
“overruled” by that court,158 possibly in mistaken reliance on Pitchers’ Case. And,
similar to the arguments in that case, the circuit court viewed the facts in James as
simple patent infringement by a lower level government official which could not be
imputed to the federal government as a taking.159 The court found for the plaintiffs,
Id.
See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358–59 (1881).
155 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
156 Id. at 359.
157 Id. at 357.
158 Id.
159 Compare James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1881) (“We doubt very much whether such
an action can be sustained. It is substantially a suit against the United States itself, which cannot
be maintained under the guise of a suit against its officers and agents except in the manner
provided by law.”), with Adams v. Bradley, 1 F. Cas. 93, 97 (C.C.D. Nev. 1878) (No. 48) (“Without an
153
154
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who had brought an action in equity, likely because of the new injunctive relief
provisions of the Patent Act of 1870.160
However, the Supreme Court overturned this result. It first reiterated its
position from earlier cases that the United States has no more rights to practice
patents duly issued to others than regular citizens do, absent authorization from
and/or compensation to the patent owner.161 But, it built upon Judge Nott’s concerns
in McKeever over the special issues of patents with little to no use outside the
government: “Many inventions relate to subjects which can only be properly used by
the government, such as explosive shells, rams, and submarine batteries to be
attached to armed vessels. If it could use such inventions without compensation, the
inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and experiments.”162
Further, it offered some insights into how the government was trying to manage a
new world in which inventions were becoming increasingly important to the
execution of governmental functions:
It has been the general practice, when inventions have been made which
are desirable for government use, either for the government to purchase
them from the inventors, and use them as secrets of the proper department;
or, if a patent is granted, to pay the patentee a fair compensation for their
use.163
The Court also strengthened its comments from Burn’s Case that there would be no
equivalent in U.S. patent law to British Crown Rights.164 Related to this, the Court
stated that patent applicants, upon satisfying the statutory criteria, are “entitled to

act of congress no direct proceedings will lie at the suit of an individual against the United States or
its property; and no officer of the government can waive its privilege in this respect, nor lawfully
consent that such a suit may be prosecuted so as to bind the government.”).
160 Campbell v. James, 4 F. Cas. 1168, 1173 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879) (No. 2361) rev’d, 104 U.S. 356
(1881); see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§ 52, 55, 58, 60, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217.
161 Id. at 357–58.

Id.

That the government of the United States when it grants letters-patent for a new
invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation
land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no doubt.
The
Constitution gives to Congress power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries,’ which could not be effected if the government had a
reserved right to publish such writings or to use such inventions without the consent of
the owner.

Id. at 358.
Id.
164 Id. (“The United States has no such prerogative as that which is claimed by the sovereigns
of England, by which it can reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a superior dominion
and use in that which it grants by letters-patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants.”).
162
163
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[the patent grant] as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally
supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor.”165
But, the James Court also took pains to suggest, in dicta, that the Court of
Claims’ recommendation that infringement actions be brought directly against
government officials in the circuit courts was just plain wrong:
The course adopted in the present case, of instituting an action against a
public officer, who acts only for and in behalf of the government, is open to
serious objections. We doubt very much whether such an action can be
sustained. It is substantially a suit against the United States itself, which
cannot be maintained under the guise of a suit against its officers and
agents except in the manner provided by law.166
The Court did, however, acknowledge the existing statutory and jurisdictional
challenges to plaintiffs seeking compensation, or even injunctive relief, for
unauthorized use of their patents by the government.167 At the same time, given the
change of position in the Court of Claims, as evidenced by decisions such as
McKeever, the James Court noted that patent owners could approach the Court of
Claims with actions in assumpsit based on theories of implied contract with the
government.168 Ultimately, however, the James Court conceded that the Court of
Claims’ jurisdiction in such matters has not been tested by the Supreme Court, and
that if the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction does not reach to these cases, then “the only
remedy against the United States, until Congress enlarges the jurisdiction of that
165 Id. This last point is also supported by the affirmative language in both the 1836 and 1870
patent acts that patents must be issued where the invention and application meet all requisite
criteria. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20; Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230 § 24,
16 Stat. 198, 201.
166 James, 104 U.S. at 359. Similar arguments would later be considered in Ex Parte Young
with regard to actions to obtain injunctions against state officials in their individual capacity in
ways that were clearly attempts to limit state action. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In that
case, Railway stockholders filed suit against the Minnesota State Attorney General complaining
that a state statute establishing railway rates was unconstitutional. Id. at 129. The district court
enjoined the enforcement of the statute, and when the Attorney General violated the injunction by
attempting to enforce the statute anyway, the court found him in contempt and issued an injunction
against him in his individual capacity. Id. at 132. The Attorney General appealed on the basis of
state sovereign immunity. Id. at 141. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that state officials did
not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity when they attempt to enforce unconstitutional laws.
Id. at 167.
167 James, 104 U.S. at 358–59.
[T]he mode of obtaining compensation from the United States for the use of an
invention, where such use has not been by the consent of the patentee, has never
been specifically provided for by any statute. The most proper forum for such a
claim is the Court of Claims, if that court has the requisite jurisdiction. As its
jurisdiction does not extend to torts, there might be some difficulty, as the law
now stands, in prosecuting in that court a claim for the unauthorized use of a
patented invention . . . .
Id.
168 Id. at 359 (“[W]here the tort is waived, and the claim is placed upon the footing of an
implied contract, we understand that the court has in several recent instances entertained the
jurisdiction.”).
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court, would be to apply to Congress itself.”169 Because the James Court was able to
decide the case on the basis of patent invalidity anyway, it expressly disavowed any
resolution of these other issues at that time.170 Notwithstanding these other issues,
the central finding that neither the government nor its employees could practice
private patents without authorization and/or compensation was now settled enough
to be treated as the law of the land by at least one major patent treatise of the
period.171
By the end of the decade, Congress had indeed enlarged the Court of Claims’
jurisdiction. Under a revised and restated enabling statute passed in 1887, the Court
of Claims now had the authority to “hear and determine the following matters”:
First. All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or
any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an
Executive Department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the
Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or
unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the
party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a
court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable . . . .
Second. All set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether
liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the
Government of the United States against any claimant against the
Government in said court . . . .172
Returning yet again to the issue of government rights with respect to employee
inventions, in Solomons v. United States173 and United States v. Davis,174 the Court of
Claims decided that even when a government employee is specifically charged with
inventing as a general matter, he may patent resulting inventions himself, but the
government does get a non-exclusive license.175 Inexplicably, this made the hired-toinvent claim harder for the government to prove than it was for private employers
under cases such as Hapgood v. Hewitt.176 To be clear, courts were refusing to
equitably convey title to private employers even where an employee was specifically
hired to invent unless the employee had also expressly agreed to assign the
inventions.177 However, the rationale in Solomons and Davis was not one of shop
rights, but rather that the employee could not be unjustly enriched by work done for
Id.
Id.
171 See ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXTBOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 145 (Baker, Voorhis & Co., 4th ed. 1904).
172 Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)).
173 Solomons v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 335 (1887).
174 United States v. Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. 329 (1888).
175 Solomons, 22 Ct. Cl. at 342; Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. at 334.
176 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886).
177 E.g., id. at 233 (affirming the district court’s decision that the employee-inventor’s contract,
as written, did not require him to assign his patent to the employer, and thus, title to the employeeinventor’s patent had not been equitably assigned to the employer).
169
170
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the government by being effectively paid twice for the invention he was hired to
make.178 At the same time, the Solomons and Davis decisions allowed the employees
to enforce their patents against private third parties, which would mean that they
were still profiting in some ways from their government work beyond their regular
compensation.179
In 1888, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims finding of implied
contract as a basis for recovery against the government in United States v. Palmer,180
on a fact pattern quite similar to McKeever. In fact, the government use at issue—in
this case, patented infantry equipment, including braces—stemmed from the same
military board procurement process as that in McKeever.181 Likewise, the same
record of express adoption of the patented inventions by the government was found
by the Court of Claims.182 Also similarly, the government later argued that its
alleged actions were simply patent infringement—a tort—that fell outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.183 Affirming the Court of Claims, the Palmer
Court held that jurisdiction in the Court of Claims was proper where there was an
express or implied contract with the government:
[W]hile that objection [that an action on a patent cannot be brought in the
Court of Claims] may be available as to actions for infringement of a patent,
in which its validity may be put in issue, and in which the peculiar defenses
authorized by the patent laws . . . may be set up, it is not valid as against
actions founded on contracts for the use of patented inventions.184
In Palmer, the Court had already confirmed that: “This is not a claim for
infringement, but a claim of compensation for an unauthorized use,-two things
totally distinct in the law; as distinct as trespass on lands is from use and occupation
under a lease.”185
The Supreme Court then affirmed Solomons in 1890, but did not find a hired-toinvent right in the government, and wrote in dicta what became the seminal
formulation of the hired-to-invent rule:
An employe[e], performing all the duties assigned to him in his department
of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he chooses,
with the assurance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and
perfect is his individual property. There is no difference between the
government and any other employer in this respect. But this general rule is
Davis, 23 Ct. Cl. at 334.
E.g., id. (discussing only the limitations on remedies against the government, not private
third parties, against whom the patent would be enforceable).
180 United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
181 Compare id. at 262–63, with McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. at 442 (recounting a
military board made up of the same officers to meet July 1, 1874 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).
182 Palmer, 128 U.S. at 268–69.
183 Id. at 269.
184 Id. (citing United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246 (1870) and other cases, and
distinguishing Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863)).
185 Id.
178
179
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subject to these limitations: If one is employed to devise or perfect an
instrument, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he cannot,
after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed, plead
title thereto as against his employer. That which he has been employed and
paid to accomplish becomes, when accomplished, the property of his
employer. Whatever rights as an individual he may have had in and to his
inventive powers, and that which they are able to accomplish, he has sold in
advance to his employer.186
Meanwhile, the shop rights and hired-to-invent doctrines for private companies
continued to evolve as the Supreme Court decided two new cases in 1893. First, in
Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Manufacturing Co., the Court held that the express
agreement necessary for invocation of the hired-to-invent exception and equitable
conveyance of patent rights need not be in writing.187 And second, in Lane & Bodley
Co. v. Locke, the Court held that, where the employee conducted experiments at his
employer’s expense, and then remained employed for a long time with full knowledge
that the resultant invention was being used by the employer, the employee had
granted an implied license to the employer.188
That same year, the Supreme Court decided another government employee case
in McAleer v. United States.189 The employee argued that he executed a formal
assignment of the patent to the government in exchange for consideration that
included his continued employment.190 However, there was nothing in the written
agreement to that effect.191 While the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and
endorsed the lower court’s references to Solomon and Davis, the true basis of the
holding was that the written assignment agreement was “a complete legal obligation
in itself, with no uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, and could
not be defeated, contradicted, or varied by proof of any collateral parol agreement
inconsistent with its terms.”192
Around this same time, the Court of Claims found that a government employee
who invented a device before being employed by the government was not receiving
unjust enrichment when he required compensation for government use of his
patented invention in Talbert v. United States.193 The Supreme Court affirmed the
case in 1894, but only on the limited appeal of the amount of compensation, which
the Court found to be an issue of fact, not law.194 An important theme developing in
the government employee cases was the prevention of government employees abusing
their offices by requiring the government to use their patents and then profiting from
the royalties.

Solomons v. United States, 11 S. Ct. 88 (1890).
Dalzell v. Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893).
188 Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 201 (1893).
189 McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424 (1893).
190 Id. at 432.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 432.
193 Talbert v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 141, 153–55 (1890).
194 Talbert v. United States, 155 U.S. 45, 46 (1894).
186
187
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That same year, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Schillinger v.
United States,195 which involved a patent for an improvement in laying concrete
pavement issued to John J. Schillinger.196 The actual infringer was a government
contractor working for the architect of the U.S. Capitol to lay concrete pavement on
the Capitol grounds.197 Further, this contractor had indemnified the United States
for any patent infringement actions against the latter arising from the execution of
this work, even as there was substantial debate as to whether the architect knew
that the contractor might employ a pavement arguably infringing the Schillinger
patent.198 Yet, unlike the patent owner in James v. Campbell, who chose to bring a
personal action against an officer of the United States in circuit court,199 and perhaps
following the Supreme Court’s admonishment in that case,200 the owners of the
Schillinger patent brought an action in assumpsit based on an implied contract
theory directly against the United States in the Court of Claims.201 However, the
wrinkle was that the actions were those of the contractor and not of government
employees.202 The Court of Claims held that there was no contract express or implied
between the government and the claimants and that accordingly the matter was
outside of its jurisdiction (as explained further below).203
The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed the Court of
Claims decision.204 The tenor of the majority’s opinion towards unauthorized
government use of private patents, as expressed by Justice Brewer in his opinion for
the majority, is quite different from that in the James case.205 Whereas, in James,
the question of the nature of the patent grant was discussed by the majority and
dissent alternately as property or contract, in Schillinger, the focus of potential
government liability for unauthorized use of a private patent was first and foremost
on the sovereign immunity of the United States:
The United States cannot be used in their courts without their consent, and
in granting such consent congress has an absolute discretion to specify the
cases and contingencies in which the liability of the government is
submitted to the courts for judicial determination. Beyond the letter of such
consent the courts may not go, no matter how beneficial they may deem, or
in fact might be, their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities
of the government.206

Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
Id. at 163.
197 Id. at 164.
198 Id.
199 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 359 (1881).
200 Id. at 358–59.
201 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1894).
202 Id. at 171–72.
203 Id. at 165–66.
204 Id. at 165–66.
205 Compare id., with James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
206 Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166.
195
196
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The Court then reviewed the relevant history of the U.S. Court of Claims and
concluded that the latter had no jurisdiction to hear cases against the government
arising in tort.207 Applying this to the case at hand, it argued that the patent
infringement at issue “was a tort pure and simple.”208 But, the outcome of this
analysis was that because the activities at issue were primarily those of the private
contractor—amounting to a misappropriation sounding only in tort—and not a
breach of an express or implied contract by the government, then the case fell outside
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.209 At the same time, because the Court
holds that the government’s power to choose whether and when it can be sued in its
own courts is essentially absolute, the claimants have no remedy or recourse against
the government in any other forum either.210
The Court also addressed the argument that a government taking of private
property creates a claim “founded upon the constitution of the United States” that
brings it squarely within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the 1887 Act,
regardless of whether the taking was also a misappropriation.211 This is a powerful
argument that the Court rebuffs primarily through a reductio ad absurdum:
If that argument be good, it is equally good applied to every other provision
of the constitution as well as to every law of congress. This prohibition of
the taking of private property for public use without compensation is no
more sacred than that other constitutional provision that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Can it be
that congress intended that every wrongful arrest and detention of an
individual, or seizure of his property by an officer of the government, should
expose it to an action for damages in the court of claims? If any such
breadth of jurisdiction was contemplated, language which had already been
given a restrictive meaning would have been carefully avoided.212
At the same time the Court appeared willing to grant that an action against the
government seeking compensation for use of a privately held patent might properly
lie within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims based on a theory of express or
implied contract. The Court cited the facts of Palmer for the easy case where the
patentee “‘invited the government to adopt his patented infantry equipments, and
the government did so.”213 Under those facts, “‘an implied contract for compensation
fairly arose under the license to use, and the actual use, little or much, that ensued

Id. at 167–168.
Id. at 169 (“The petition charges a wrongful appropriation by the government, against the
protest of the claimants, and prays to recover the damages done by such wrong.”).
209 Id. at 170.
210 Id. at 166. Except, perhaps, the sort of direct appeal to Congress that the Court states was
the sole recourse for any claimant against the government before the Court of Claims was
established in the first place. Id.
211 Id. at 168.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888)).
207
208
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thereon.”214 This was similar to the decisions in Burns and McKeever. The Court
then cited other property use cases where an implied contract was held to have been
entered into by the government.215 In each, the key elements for the Court seemed to
have been that (i) there was at least some meeting of the minds between the property
owner and the government evidencing the assent of the owner to such use, and (ii)
the government gave clear acknowledgment that it was appropriating the use of the
owner’s property and thus made “no pretense of title.”216
But, in Schillinger, “the claimants never authorized the use of the patent right
by the government; never consented to, but always protested against it; threatening
to interfere by injunction or other proceedings to restrain such use.”217 Further:
There was no point in the whole transaction from its commencement to its
close where the minds of the parties met, or where there was anything in
the semblance of an agreement. So, not only does the petition count upon a
tort, but also the findings show a tort. That is the essential fact underlying
the transaction, and upon which rests every pretense of a right to recover.218
Thus, even while the Court conceded that “a party may sometimes waive a tort and
sue in assumpsit, as on an implied promise,” it countered that “it is technically a
sufficient reply to say that these claimants have not done so. They have not counted
on any promise, either express or implied.”219
At the same time, the Court made it clear that its opinion was not merely an
exercise in formalism, potentially denying relief to a righteous claimant due to a
technicality.220 Rather, the Court appeared to be troubled by what it perceived to be
a lack of clear authorization by the government, or even its agent, to infringe
Schillinger’s patent:
There was no act of congress in terms directing or even by implication
suggesting, the use of the patent. No officer of the government directed its
use, and the contract which was executed by [the contractor] did not name
or describe it. There was no recognition by the government or any of its
officers of the fact that in the construction of the pavement there was any
use of the patent, or that any appropriation was being made of claimants’
property. The government proceeded as though it were acting only in the
management of its own property and the exercise of its own rights, and
without any trespass upon the rights of the claimants.221

214 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 170 (1894) (quoting United States v. Palmer, 128
U.S. 262 (1888)).
215 See id. (citing United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 63 (1871)); id. at 171 (citing United States v.
Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884)).
216 See Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 171.
217 Id. at 170.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 169.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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These facts would mitigate against a finding of an implied contract under the Court’s
criteria set out above.
The Court also seemed to suggest an element of bad faith on the part of the
claimants for the latter’s use of the tort waiver/implied contract argument upon
appeal: “There was no suggestion of a waiver of the tort, or a pretense of any implied
contract, until after the decision of the court of claims that it had no jurisdiction over
an action to recover for the tort.”222 Finally, the Court took a further swipe at the
legitimacy of claimants’ allegations of infringement by the government in that the
latter wound up with none of the claimants’ property at the end of the project:
But what property of the claimants has the government appropriated? It
has and uses the pavement as completed in the capitol grounds, but there is
no pretense of a patent on the pavement as a completed structure. When a
contractor, in the execution of his contract, uses any patented tool, machine,
or process, and the government accepts the work done under such contract,
can it be said to have appropriated and be in possession of any property of
the patentee in such a sense that the patentee may waive the tort, and sue
as on an implied promise?223
However, this eminent domain power seemed to reach only the practice of the
patent by or on behalf of the government (i.e., as part of a government function or
service) and required compensation for the taking.224 It did not authorize the
conventional compulsory license, where the sovereign grants, or requires the grant of,
a license from the patent holder to one or more of the latter’s competitors to be used
in competition with the patent holder. This conventional compulsory license is a
“rarity” in the U.S. patent system.225
The difference between the eminent domain license and the conventional
compulsory license is not merely semantic. Rather, it is decidedly practical because
it determines who pays the patent owner for the unauthorized use of her patent. In
the eminent domain license, the government must compensate her either when it
practices the patent directly or when it authorizes a private contractor to practice the
patent on its behalf.226 But, the sole arbiter of this compensation is the Court of
Federal Claims, and the patent owner must bring suit there to receive any
compensation—no payments flow “automatically” from the exercise of the eminent
domain license.227 Contrast this with the conventional compulsory license in which
Id. at 170.
Id. at 172.
224 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 177–78 (1894) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
If Schillinger’s patent was valid, then the government is bound by an obligation of
the highest character to compensate him for the use of his invention, and its use
by the government cannot be said to arise out of mere tort, at least where its
representative did not himself dispute, nor assume to decide, the validity of the
patent.
222
223
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Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 234, 244 (1979).
227 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)
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either the government sets the compensation rate ex ante as part of the license grant,
or a court or administrative body establishes what a “reasonable” royalty rate is ex
post.228 In either of these cases, the licensed party—who is permitted to bring the
patented product to market on its own behalf as a private commercial venture—pays
the patent owner for this unauthorized use of the patent owner’s patent.229
Consequently, the conventional compulsory license is a better financial
proposition for the government. But, absent specific language in the compulsory
license order to the contrary, the government is left with relatively little control over
how the patent will be practiced and has no right to practice the patent itself.
Further, the conventional compulsory license is likely viewed with far more distaste
by patent owners than the eminent domain license because a compulsory license
authorizes a patent owner’s competitors to compete with her in the commercial
marketplace based on her own technology.230 The eminent domain license instead
gives the government control over the practice of the patent even while it keeps the
patent owner’s commercial competitors at bay.231
Therefore, a fundamental issue in considering either type of involuntary grant is
the policy objective the government is trying to achieve. For example, if the objective
is simply to level a commercial playing field where a patent owner has acted in an
anticompetitive manner based in part on her patents, then a compulsory license to
competitors might be warranted. In fact, such compulsory licenses (as well as
outright assignments) have been key components of settlements of some antitrust
actions brought by the federal government.232 But, if instead the objective is to make
sure that the government has access to technology that it needs to fulfill its core
purposes, then clearly an eminent domain license is indicated. Indeed, it was the
concern that the federal government would not be able to procure enough munitions
in wartime that led to the statutory codification of the government’s eminent domain
powers regarding patents.233 Private contractors had become reluctant to take on
government munitions contracts because they feared patent infringement lawsuits by
the private patent owners whose inventions had been incorporated without
authorization or license into those munitions.234

228 Compare Christopher Gibson, A Look At the Compulsory License In Investment Arbitration:
The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 364 (2010) (stating that compulsory
licenses are normally granted on an ex post basis in the patent context), with 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)
(establishing ex ante royalty rates for compulsory licensing of secondary cable transmissions of
copyrighted works), and 17 U.S.C. §§ 801, 803 (establishing a panel of Copyright Royalty Judges
charged with making rate determinations for various compulsory licenses on both ex ante and ex
post bases).
229 Christopher Gibson, A Look At the Compulsory License In Investment Arbitration: the Case
of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 364–65 (2010).
230 Id. at 367.
231 See, e.g., Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166–67 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (explaining that
the eminent domain license provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1498 grants rights only to the U.S. Government
and its contractors, and not to the patentee’s competitors).
232 See, e.g., United States v. 3D Sys. Corp. & DTM Corp., No. Civ. 1:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL
964343 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001).
233 See infra Part II.
234 Id.
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The value of the government’s eminent domain powers with respect to patents is
practically limited then in two ways. First, it must still compensate the patent owner
for the use, which adds to the cost of procuring the good or service that it needs.235
Second, private contractors may still be subject to the costs of responding in court to
infringement lawsuits, before moving to have them dismissed.236 Accordingly, where
the government can develop its own technologies, it can avoid the complications of
takings actions.
There are three further reasons why the government might be interested in
developing its own technologies and holding the related patents. First, assuming the
validity of the theory that government’s main purpose is to provide necessary
services that will not be forthcoming from the private sector in a market economy,
there will be any number of technologies that the government will need that will
simply not be developed in a timely fashion, or at all, without government
intervention.237 Second, it may be in the general interest to have some sensitive
technologies controlled by the federal government, rather than by private parties, at
least until the technology falls into the public domain and is freely available to all.238
Third, commencing with the government’s direct involvement in scientific and
technological research and development (“R&D”) through both its own intramural
research and its support of extramural research, it has found itself in the position of
holding at least equitable rights to patents arising from such R&D, similar to
employers and other private funders of R&D initiatives.239 This leads directly to the
question of whether the government should be giving away what is arguably its
property, and if so, under what conditions.
A year after Schillinger, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Berdan
Firearms Manufacturing Co. on appeal from the Court of Claims.240 Although
235 Wesley D. Greenwell, State Immunity for Patent Infringement Lawsuits:
Inverse
Condemnation as an Alternative Remedy, 63 S.C. L. REV. 975, 991 (2012).
236 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
237 See Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 943–
44 (2009) (explaining that through funding upstream research, the government ensures that certain
discoveries will be made that would otherwise not exist because “private entities tend to underinvest
in research because they cannot appreciate its full social value”).
238 See id. at 937–40 (discussing the value of government seizure of health related technology
in some circumstances). Of course, extremely sensitive technologies, such as new weaponry, might
be best controlled by keeping it confidential within the Department of Defense in the first place.
Provisions for control of patents related to national security are located in Chapter 17 of the Patent
Act. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012). This portion of the Patent Act seems to support my control rationale for
some federally owned patents. Id. (“Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an
application or grant of a patent on an invention in which the Government has a property interest
might . . . be detrimental to the national security, the Commissioner of Patents upon being so
notified shall order that the invention be kept secret . . . .”). In a related vein, the relatively recent
provision for “statutory invention registrations” (“SIRs”) allows federal agencies to effectively force
inventions into the public domain without relying on the uncertainty of mere publication to effect
the same result. See 35 U.S.C. § 157.
239 See McElmurry v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580 (describing “shop right” as
“a right that is created at common law, when the circumstances demand it, under principles of
equity and fairness, entitling an employer to use without charge an invention patented by one of
more of its employees without liability for infringement.”).
240 Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co. v. United States, 156 U.S. 552 (1895).
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seemingly similar to McKeever and Palmer, this case was more difficult. Berdan, the
patent owner, sought compensation on two separate patents for guns.241 On the first
patent, which was a combination patent, the government appears not to have used
all elements of the combination, and thus the Court of Claims rejected, and the
Supreme Court affirmed, that the government neither infringed the patent nor had
any kind of express or implied contract for use of the patented invention.242 On the
second patent, the Court of Claims found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the
government did indeed use the patented invention in a manner that “were [the
government] a private person, [it] would be liable to an action of infringement.”243
The government tried to argue both that one of its own engineers had later
“invented” the particular device and that the employee’s version was materially
different from Berdan’s patent, as well as that the government had used it based only
on the knowledge of its own employee’s invention.244 But, of course, independent
discovery is no defense to patent infringement.245 Notwithstanding, the Court
acknowledged that “something more than a mere infringement, which is a tort, and
not within the jurisdiction of the court of claims, is necessary to enable the petitioner
to maintain this action.”246 In particular, “[s]ome contractual liability must be
shown.”247 The Court then found the evidence to fairly show that Berdan intended
for the government to use the invention with his consent, in accordance with his
wishes, and with the expectation of compensation.248 In this case, however, the Court
emphasized the need for evidence of mutuality of assent to find an express or implied
contract.249 While this is indeed black letter contract law—as good now as it was in
the nineteenth century—the Palmer and McKeever courts do not seem to have
focused on it as carefully.250 Nonetheless, after reviewing the evidence in detail, the
Berdan Court found both no evidence negating assent on the part of the government
and some evidence positively showing assent by at least some officers in the
military.251 This was sufficient to “bring the case clearly within U.S. v. Palmer,” and
for the Court to affirm the Court of Claims’ finding of a contract sufficient to award
some recovery to Berdan.252 The failure of the parties to set a price for the license
was found to be no more problematic here than it was in Palmer or United States. v.
Russell.253
Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 565–66.
243 Id. at 566.
244 Id.
245 Karen E. Sandrik, Warranting Rightful Claims, 72 LA. L. REV. 873, 903–04 (2012) (“Unlike
copyright law, which grants a defense based on independent discovery, patent law provides no goodfaith defense to an infringement claim. Thus, defendants have on defense based on unintentional or
inadvertent infringement.”).
246 Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co. v. United States, 156 U.S. 552, 566 (1895).
247 Id.
248 Id. at 567–68.
249 Id.
250 United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888); McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396
(1878).
251 Berdan Firearms, 156 U.S. at 568–69.
252 Id. at 569.
253 See supra text accompanying note 137.
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In 1896, the Supreme Court considered yet a different angle in this ongoing
battle. In Belknap v. Schild, the patent owner sought an injunction and damages
against the government officials who operated a caisson gate at a government facility
in California covered by his patents.254 The lower court had granted both the
injunctions and a damages award of $40,000 against the officials.255 The Supreme
Court agreed that government officials were not immune from suit simply because of
their position, even when acting within their official capacities.256 However,
injunctions against individual officials, which would have the effect of precluding the
government from using its property, could not be allowed without the United States
as a joined party.257 Further, where the profits arising from the unauthorized use by
the officials accrued only to the government rather than the officials personally, then
damages for those profits could not be awarded against the officials.258 Justice
Harlan dissented on the grounds that the majority’s ruling would leave patent
owners with no effective remedies against the government for unauthorized use of
patents where no argument for implied license could bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.259
That same year, the Supreme Court also returned yet again to government
employee inventions in Gill v. United States.260 The claimed distinction was that
Gill, the employee, had been hired neither to invent nor to use his inventive
capacities in any regard and had come up with the inventions on his own time,
without the use of government resources.261 However, he then actually reduced the
inventions to practice with government resources, and personally supervised the
other government employees who built working versions of his arsenal machines.262
Further, he never mentioned any proprietary position as against the government, nor
did he attempt to charge or reserve the right to charge, the government for use of the
machines until years later.263 No government official discussed any license or
purchase terms with him for such government use.264 Gill later sold the rights to use
his inventions to private parties, while reserving a right of use to the government,
but the government remained the primary user of the inventions as they were
specially adapted to military uses.265 The Court of Claims had dismissed the claims,
and the Supreme Court affirmed.266 Aligning with later government patent policy
under the Bayh-Dole Act,267 the Supreme Court considered the notion that the use of
government resources to actually reduce the invention to practice could be enough to
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
Id. at 14.
256 Id. at 18.
257 Id. at 18.
258 Id. at 25–26.
259 Id. at 28 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260 Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896).
261 Id. at 433.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 436–37.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 438 n. 1.
266 Id. at 438.
267 Joanna K. Sax, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Science, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 291 (2012)
(discussing the changing role of government in the patent landscape).
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grant at least a shop right license to the government, even though the invention had
been conceived and constructively reduced to practice outside the scope of
employment.268 But, ultimately, it based its affirmance on the grounds that Gill had
granted an implied license to the government by his actions.269
Even as the courts were working out the nature and contours of government use
of employee and private citizen patents, the beginnings of formal government
research funding began with intramural research conducted by the Department of
Agriculture and Department of War early in the nineteenth century.270 The
beginnings of extramural research arose later under the Morrill Act,271 Second
Morrill Act,272 and Hatch Act of 1887,273 which provided support for state Land Grant
Universities, Agricultural Colleges, and Agricultural Experiment Stations,
respectively. Once inventions started flowing from this research, the government
needed to formulate policies for ownership and use of such government-funded
inventions. In the absence of federal policy guidance, universities held patents as
independent legal entities, while professors occasionally patented inventions
resulting from their research and simply took title as individuals.274
II. MOVING TOWARDS RESOLUTION: EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY STATUTORY AND CASE
LAW DEVELOPMENTS
As the twentieth century opened, all three strands of government patent policy
were effectively governed by case law. Government use of private patents was
limited to suit for compensation in the Court of Claims, provided that the patent
owner could show at least an implied license. An open question remained as to the
ability of patent owners to sue government officials in narrow ways for either
injunctions or damages. Government rights to employee inventions were limited,
with the normal result being a shop right license—even where the employee was
hired to invent. And finally, government rights to inventions arising under
extramural research appeared not to have been tested at all.
In 1900’s Eager v. United States, the Court of Claims decided yet another case
where a government employee sought compensation for the government’s use of his
patented invention.275 In this case, a mechanic who was not hired to invent, but who,
through his primary machinist duties, might design improvements to ordnance, had
Id. at 433–35.
Id. at 436–38.
270 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT 13 (1947)
[hereinafter “BIDDLE REPORT”].
271 Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–09 (2012)).
272 Second Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–29).
273 Hatch Act of 1887, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a–361i).
274 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,647 to Samuel Morse (of New York University) in 1840; U.S.
Patent No. 136,708 to William Dale (of Pennsylvania State College) in 1873; U.S. Patent No.
174,465 to Alexander G. Bell (of Boston University) in 1878; U.S. Patent No. 389,021 to Adolf
Sommer (of University of California) in 1888; and U.S. Patent Nos. 638,837 thru 638,840 to Reginald
Fessenden (of University of Pittsburgh) in 1899. The Author thanks Gregg Graff for these citations.
275 Eager v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 556 (1900).
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improved upon suggested plans of his supervisor on his own time, and at his own
house, for a machine to rifle cannon barrels.276 Streett, the inventor, made a claim to
the Secretary of the Navy for compensation for his inventions, which was declined.277
Neither he, nor his assignee, Eager, attempted to enter into a contract with the Navy
licensing these inventions until after commencement of the Court of Claims
proceeding.278 The court cited Solomons279 and Gill,280 while making much of the
facts that Streett was “surrounded” by other talented individuals and that he was
supervised by “knowledgeable” scientific and technical men,281 to find that neither
Streett nor his assignee was entitled to compensation.282 The court seemed to doubt
the validity of the patent, or perhaps even the sole inventor status of Streett, but
neither issue was before it in the case.283
The next year, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims dismissal of a
patent owner’s claim for recovery in Russell v. United States.284 The plaintiff, a
Captain of Ordnance in the Army, had a lengthy exchange with the Chief of
Ordnance about whether the Army would adopt the plaintiff’s patented rifle
magazine at a time when the Army was considering adopting a completely new rifle
model.285 While this exchange initially seemed quite similar to those recounted in
cases favorable to findings for compensation based on an implied contract, such as
Palmer,286 McKeever,287 and Berdan,288 it then seemed to veer into more careful
statements on the part of the government while also sending Russell on an odd and
futile inquiry to the Patent Office to speak with the Commissioner of Patents
regarding the Patent Office’s jurisdiction.289 Overall, it seemed like the Chief of
Ordnance, on behalf of the Army, was giving Russell the run around and taking
advantage of the latter’s clear lack of understanding of the exact process of seeking
either a license or compensation.290 In other words, representatives of the Chief
seemed to lead Russell to think that an arrangement might be worked out, even as
they also suggested that the Norwegian company, who had won the overall bid to
deliver the new army rifles, would compensate Russell either directly or through
some sort of indemnification agreement with the government.291 It is true that, as
the exchange went on, representatives of the Chief used increasingly careful
language to basically push off Russell and let him know that he had to take up

Id. at 566.
Id. at 560.
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280 Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896).
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matters directly with the Norwegian firm or through the Court of Claims.292 In the
end, Russell was forced to bring an action in the Court of Claims. He sought to
position just as Palmer, McKeever, and Berdan had, but the Court of Claims
sustained the government’s demurrer that no government official had in fact implied
a contract to Russell.293 Writing for the Supreme Court on the appeal, Justice
McKenna made much of the fact that the Army had adopted the Norwegian firm’s
overall rifle design and not Russell’s.294 But, Russell had never argued that his
patents covered the overall design of the gun. Rather, he simply claimed that his
patented magazine design was included in the Norwegian firm’s overall design.295 As
if not understanding that a patent on an overall unit such as a rifle, or on some
constituent parts, need not be in conflict with a patent on a specific separate
component of that overall unit, both the Chief of Ordnance and the courts kept
referring to the Patent Office’s grant of a patent to the Norwegian firm for either a
patent on the entire gun (perhaps as a combination of other elements) or some parts
of it, as if that were conclusive evidence that Russell’s patent could not have been
infringed by the manufacture and use of the Norwegian design.296 Notwithstanding
the misleading way that the Chief’s representatives seemed to deal with Russell, the
Court may have been correct that by the end of the exchange of letters it was hard to
make out an argument that the Army had assented to even an implied license.297
Thus, both the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court concluded that there was no
license.
But, this of course then meant that Russell was out of luck, as he could not sue
the government for the tort of patent infringement. Thus, the question is whether
the government had wised up after its failed attempts to escape compensation to
patent owners (who in some cases were also military employees), such as Palmer,
McKeever, and Berdan, by seeking to make sure that its officers in charge of
procurement never made any clear statements to patent owners that might look like
assent to a license. If so, then this set the government on an abusive infringement
policy that would give it de facto Crown Rights, as it could use patented inventions
adversely with no hint of compensation and then hide behind the shield of sovereign
immunity. While this might have indirectly affected the goals of the government
attorneys, in earlier cases, who cited British cases to argue that the U.S. government
did possess something like a Crown Right, it surely went directly against the
manifold Supreme Court opinions stating clearly that the United States did not have
such rights.
A few years later, in 1905, Justice McKenna once again wrote an opinion that
essentially rejected rights for a government employee to receive compensation from
the government for use of a patented invention.298 In Harley v. United States, an
employee of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing had responded to the need for a
register that could be placed on presses to control the printing of valuable securities
Id. at 520, 532.
Id. at 516.
294 Id. at 531.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 521–23, 531–32, 535.
297 Id. at 535.
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by submitting his design to the Chief of the Bureau.299 The Chief knew this was
Harley’s own design and, upon concerns of Harley about seeking a patent to protect
his interests, the Chief assured him, “[c]ertainly; I will see that you are protected.”300
The Chief even went so far as to secure the services of a patent attorney for
Harley.301 The device was shown to the Secretary of the Treasury, who quickly
endorsed it.302 However, while Harley claimed to have expected compensation and
that he believed that the Chief and the Secretary understood and agreed to this, the
Chief and the Secretary claimed that they believed that, because Harley was a
Treasury Department employee, he would neither expect nor demand
remuneration.303 There was no argument that Harley was hired to invent the
register or that he had done it on Treasury time or with Treasury resources.304 Six
years went by with the Bureau using, on average, 200 of the registers per day over a
period of 1082 working days.305 While the Court made much of the fact that Harley
did not bring an express claim for remuneration either directly within the Bureau or
Treasury or in the Court of Claims during this time, Harley argued that he was
coerced by his subordinate position into not making more demands for compensation
until finally bringing this suit.306 Justice McKenna brushed this off in what seemed
a quite harsh position: He seemed to think it was silly and unacceptable that Harley
felt intimidated,307 but this may reveal more about McKenna and his great good
fortune in being a Supreme Court Justice than about the true merits and equities of
the situation. In the end, similar to the outcome of Russell, the Court found the
government’s efforts effective and persuasive in showing that, at least from its end,
no assent had been forthcoming and thus there could have been no “meeting of the
minds” to form a valid contract.308 It specifically cited Russell in support, and
distinguished the instant facts from McKeever.309 It also cited Schillinger and
Berdan for the proposition that contracts or obligations arising from tort (e.g., where
the tort was waived by the patent owner and a suit was brought on the grounds of
the quasi-contract assumpsit) would not satisfy the requirement for a true meeting of
the minds and contract.310 This arguably raised the bar from earlier cases, which
made out an implied contract exactly on the waived-tort assumpsit theory.
In response to these developments, the question of redress for government use of
private patents came to a head in Congress, and legislation was enacted. The first
version of the Government Use Statute was passed as the Act of June 25, 1910,
entitled “An Act to Provide Additional Protection for Owners of Patents of the United
States, and for Other Purposes.”311 The title was telling because it positioned the Act
Id. at 229–30.
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as something to benefit patent owners and not the government. The original text is
as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States shall hereafter be
used by the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful
right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable compensation for
such use by suit in the Court of Claims: Provided, however, That said Court
of Claims shall not entertain a suit or reward compensation under the
provisions of this Act where the claim for compensation is based on the use
by the United States of any article heretofore owned, leased, used by, or in
the possession of, the United States: Provided further, That in any such
suit the United States may avail itself of any and all defenses, general or
special, which might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for
infringement, as set forth in [the Patent Act]: And provided further, That
the benefits of this Act, shall not inure to any patentee, who, when he
makes such claim is in the employment or service of the Government of the
United States; or the assignee of any such patentee; nor shall this Act apply
to any device discovered or invented by such employee during the time of
his employment or service.312
Thus, while the Government Use Statute might seem like a compulsory license
provision at first blush to the modern reader, it was in fact carefully crafted to
address the absence of remedies for patent owners whose patents were practiced
adversely by the government, while not disturbing the growing sense in the courts
that the government should have rights to practice inventions of employees. The
first part of the statute addressed only those situations where no license could be
made out for the government use, express or implied. Further, it did not positively
authorize such use by the government, as a compulsory license or Crown Right
would. Instead, it merely established that, to the extent such use might occur, the
patent owner would no longer be left without a remedy: Such patent owners could
bring claims for compensation in the Court of Claims. In other words, this was really
an act to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. At the same time, this
would have no effect on patent owner claims based on true express or implied
contracts with the government. The first proviso addressed the fact patterns in
Pitcher’s Case313 and Belknap314 by making clear that no such suit in the Court of
Claims could provide compensation for the use by the government of physical
property it possessed. The second proviso empowered the government to use any
defenses that a private defendant could use under the Patent Act of 1870.315
Interestingly, the Act does not necessarily say that the action in the Court of Claims
Id.; Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesllschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 302–03 (1912)
Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863).
314 Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
315 Compare Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208, with Act of June 25, 1910, ch.
423, 36 Stat. 851.
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is an infringement action under the Patent Act—that would be tantamount to saying
that the government could engage in tortious activities, which the Supreme Court
had expressly rejected on many occasions.316 Thus, the action may be like one for
infringement, with similar claims and defenses, but it may not technically be an
action for infringement sounding in tort. The last proviso then established that
government employees could not use the Act either while they were employees or for
inventions created while in the government’s employ or service, if they were not
employed by the government at the time of the intent to bring suit.317 Nor could they
use assignees to essentially bring the action for them.318
Before the Act was passed, however, the German corporation Krupp had brought
suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for compensation from William
Crozier, personally, for his actions as Chief of Ordnance of the U.S. Army for the
manufacture of Krupp’s patented field guns and carriages in U.S. arsenals.319 The
claims also sought an injunction preventing Crozier from directing such manufacture
going forward.320 The latter claim likely was informed by the same legal arguments
that impelled various aggrieved railroad owners to seek injunctions against state
government officials in what became the landmark case of Ex Parte Young,321 as well
as the earlier cases of James v. Campbell and Pitcher’s Case. The original action in
Young was filed in federal circuit court one week before Krupp filed its action in the
D.C. court and sought an injunction preventing the state attorney general and others
from enforcing a new set of tariffs under a law that railroad owners believed was
unconstitutional for lack of due process.322 After the injunction issued, the attorney
general sought to enforce the law anyway and was found in contempt of court and
jailed.323 On a petition of habeas corpus based on state sovereign immunity under
the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s actions and dismissed
the petition, holding that state officials could indeed be enjoined from enforcing
illegal or unconstitutional laws.324 While this proceeding of Ex Parte Young in the
Supreme Court was decided in March 1908, less than a year after the original filing
in the circuit court,325 Krupp’s action against Crozier was not appealed to the

316 E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 258 U.S. 321, 326 (1922) (“We have in other
cases expressed our aversion [to tortious use of patents] . . . .[A contract] to pay for a mechanism
used will be implied rather than a tortious appropriation of it . . . .”).
317 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, 852; see also Crozier v. Fried. Krupp
Antiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303 (1912).
318 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, 852; see also Crozier, 224 U.S. at 303.
319 Crozier, 224 U.S. at 297.
320 Id. at 298.
321 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129 (1908).
322 Id. at 129–30.
323 Id. at 133–34.
324 Id. at 167–68. This case has had a major impact on the question of reliance by states on
their 11th Amendment sovereign immunity as a shield against patent and copyright suits. See
Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 457 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of
the Univ. of Missouri, 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also SEAN M. O’CONNOR ET AL., NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI., LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
(2010),
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_058897.pdf..
325 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 109.
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Supreme Court until 1911, after the Government Use Statute was enacted.326 In the
D.C. court, the government had demurred on the grounds of insufficient jurisdiction
on the theory that the case was really against the United States.327 Krupp had also
given up, by stipulation, its claims for damages directly from Crozier.328 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded on a holding later characterized by the Supreme
Court as:
[having] a broad distinction between interfering by injunction with the use
by the United States of its property and the granting of a writ of injunction
for the purpose of preventing the wrongful taking of private property, even
although the individual who was enjoined from such taking was an officer of
the government, and although the purpose of the proposed taking was to
appropriate the private property when taken to a governmental purpose.329
In the appeals court’s own words, as quoted by the Supreme Court:
It will thus be seen that in the Belknap and Bruce Cases the subject-matter
involved was property of the United States, and that therefore the United
States was necessarily a party. In the present case it is not sought to
disturb the United States in the possession and use of the guns already
manufactured. The court is not asked to deal with property of the United
States. The plaintiff simply asks that an officer of the United States be
restrained from invading rights granted by the government itself. The acts
complained of are not only not sanctioned by any law, but are inconsistent
with the patent laws of the United States.330
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in Crozier v. Krupp, the Supreme Court used the
intervening enactment of the Government Use Statute to sidestep resolving two
thorny and conflicting issues.331 On the one hand, the ability for patent owners to
secure injunctions against government officials for essentially performing their tasks
could effectively be injunctions against the government itself. This was untenable,
especially when important matters of the military were at stake.
But, on the other hand, earlier cases such as James had declared the principle
that ordinary government officials should not be able to commit the government to
wrongful conversions of property, and so, could be enjoined as individuals from
converting such property.332 The Court in Crozier quoted the 1910 version of the
Government Use Statute and asserted that it was passed expressly to deal with these

Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Antiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
Id. at 300.
328 Id. at 298–99.
329 Id. at 300–01.
330 Id. at 301.
331 Id. at 302. The court avoided consideration of both the “correctness of the theory upon
which the court of appeals placed its decision and the arguments in favor and against that theory.”
Id.
332 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1881).
326
327
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kinds of situations (i.e., where there was neither an implied nor express license).333
Thus, while acknowledging that the Government Use Statute primarily intended to
benefit patent owners, the Court stated that the Statute also implicitly authorized
the government to take or appropriate a license.334 The nature of the Statute then
removed the possibility of the government engaging in tortious infringement of a
patent because, at the moment of the “unauthorized” use, the government was
considered to have constructively taken a license.335 This turned the action from a
potential wrongful tort of conversion into a rightful appropriation under eminent
domain theories.336 Accordingly, the Court reversed the appeals court, with an order
to reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the bill without prejudice, so that Krupp
could bring a claim for compensation under the Government Use Statute directly
against the United States in the Court of Claims.337
The combination of the Crozier decision and the enactment of the Government
Use Statute seemed finally to resolve, at least, the issue of which rights the
government had as to unauthorized use of privately owned patents. Nonetheless,
Crozier was not entirely convincing that the Government Use Statute gave the
government positive powers or simply an express statutory mechanism for taking
licenses without permission of the owners. Thus, the uneasy issue of whether the
government was still relying on a general eminent domain power lingered, along with
the question of whether it needed to engage in a formal process before exercising this
power with regard to any particular patent.
After Crozier, it was generally assumed that federal government contractors
enjoyed the same protection under the Government Use Statute as government
officials, based in part on the exception to injunctive relief for patent owners
originating in Brady v. Atlantic Works.338 However, at the height of World War I, the
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine
Building Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co.339 In particular, the Court
sought to cut back a bit on the Crozier Court’s broad statements regarding the
government’s eminent domain rights under the Government Use Statutes as
converting, automatically, any otherwise infringing action of a government official
into a constructive license.340 More directly, the Cramp Court sought to distinguish
the likely proper scenario, where the government specifically authorizes a contractor
to manufacture an item that is covered by a third party’s patent, from the scenario
Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Antiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 302–03 (1912).
Id. at 305.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 308–09.
338 E.g., Brady v. Atl. Works, 3 F. Cas. 1190, 1192 (1876) rev’d on other grounds, 107 U.S. 192
(1883). Cases following this principle in the pre-World War I period were Firth-Sterling Steel Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 216 F. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1914), and Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Simon, 227
F. 906 (1915). Marconi was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 231 F.
1021 (1916), but then reversed by the Supreme Court in Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Simon,
246 U.S. 46 (1918), a companion case to Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int’l Curtis
Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918). See also Karl Fenning, Patent Infringement by the
Government, 37 YALE L.J. 773, 776 (1928).
339 Cramp, 246 U.S. 28, 37–39 (1918).
340 Id. at 43–44.
333
334
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where the contractor simply chooses to infringe a third party’s patent in order to
perform a contract for the government without the infringement being a necessary
part of the contracted work.341 This former scenario was in line with the injunction
exception established in Brady,342 whereas the latter was a bit more in line with the
controversy in Schillinger.343 Whatever the merits of this distinction, the net result
appeared to be a sudden reluctance on the part of key defense contractors to continue
entering into government contracts for vital wartime machinery and munitions.
Accordingly, partly as a result of a strident letter written by then Secretary of the
Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Congress voted to amend the Government Use
Statute through the Naval Appropriations Act of 1918.344 The amendment extended
the reach of the Statute to things manufactured on behalf of the government, thus
bringing the action of contractors within its scope.345 Similar wartime concerns over
patents led to the creation of the Army and Navy Patent Board.346
In 1924, the Supreme Court turned back to the question of hired-to-invent
scenarios in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck.347 The Court finally acted on the dicta in
Id. at 345.
Brady v. Atl. Works, 3 F. Cas. 1190, 1192–94 (C.C.D. Ma. 1876) (No. 1794) rev’d on other
grounds, 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
343 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 170 (1894).
344 The changes are highlighted by use of italics:
That whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States shall hereinafter be used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the
same, such owner’s remedy shall be by suit against the United States in the Court
of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture; Provided, however, That said Court of Claims shall not
entertain a suit or award compensation under the provisions of this Act where the
claim for compensation is based on the use or manufacture by or for the United
States of any article heretofore owned, leased, used by, or in the possession of the
United States . . . .
Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012))
(emphasis added).
345 Id. This interpretation of the amendment was followed by cases such as Foundation Co. v.
Underpinning & Foundation Co., 256 F. 374 (1919), and Floyd Smith Aerial Equipment Co. v. Irving
Air Chute Co., 276 F. 834 (1921). Notably, the Floyd court seemed to read in the Cramp Court’s
distinction between necessary and discretionary use of a patented invention under a government
contract as it expressly found and relied on the fact that Irving’s use of Floyd’s patented invention
was based on the express specifications of the government contract. Id. at 839. This then could be
the origins of the later “authorization and consent” requirement built into later versions of the
Government Use Statute. At any rate, the notion was first expressly articulated in Wood v. Atlantic
Gulf & Pacific Co., 296 F. 718, 719 (S.D. Ala. 1924) (holding that in order for the amended
Government Use Statute to apply, the federal government must authorize or consent to its
contractor’s infringement of a patent). A lingering question about whether cases against contractors
must be brought directly in the Court of Claims, or whether district courts retained jurisdiction was
answered by the Supreme Court decision in Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Arma Engineering Co., 271
U.S. 232 (1926). In that case, the Court held that the amended Act did not deprive district courts of
jurisdiction in cases against government contractors, but rather went to the merits of whether the
contractor was liable for the infringement. Id. at 235–36.
346 Joint Army and Navy Munitions Patent Board: Hearing on Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill
for 1920 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 65th Cong. 3 (1919) (statement of
G.H. Dorr, Assistant Dir. of Munitions, War Department).
347 Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 55 (1924).
341
342
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Solomons and Gill that inventors, under a clear agreement to invent a particular
thing as the primary or exclusive scope of their employ with compensation given for
the resultant invention, could be equitably ordered to transfer title to the hiring
party under the hired-to-invent rule.348 Peck entered into the following agreement:
This agreement witnesseth that second party is to devote his time to the
development of a process and machinery for the production of the front
spring now used on the product of the Ford Motor Company. First party is
to pay second party for such services the sum of $300 per month. That
should said process and machinery be finished at or before the expiration of
four months from August 11, 1915, second party is to receive a bonus of
$100 a month. That when finished second party is to receive a bonus of $10
for each per cent. of reduction from present direct labor, as disclosed by the
books of the first party.349
The district court had ruled that Peck had to assign the resultant patent developed
under this arrangement.350 However, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, granting the hiring party a shop right license only.351 In reversing
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court made it clear that, while the
pronouncements in Solomons and related cases about the hired-to-invent rule were
dicta, they were dicta that the prior courts had relied on to reach their actual
holdings.352 As such, the Standard Parts Court considered these statements
controlling precedent and found Peck’s agreement to be a clear case of hired-to-invent
where title should equitably be transferred to the hiring party.353
Also in 1924, the District Court for the Southern District of New York decided
Squier v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, in which an army officer, who
had invented on behalf of the army and then publicly dedicated his patent to the
public,354 sought to reclaim exclusivity against the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company (“AT&T”).355 Squier had invented in the field of wireless communication
and sought to protect his inventions for the government.356 As such, he took
advantage of the 1883 Act providing that the Patent Office waive fees for government
employees who patented inventions with use rights granted to the government.357
While he and the Signal Corps of the Army made much of the public dedication of the
patent, it was done during a period when the 1883 Act was interpreted to mean that
“any other person in the United States” meant literally any person, whether or not
connected with the government, and not simply a catch-all to authorize use by

Id. at 59.
Id. at 59.
350 Id. at 56.
351 Id. at 57–58.
352 Id. at 59.
353 Id.
354 Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 784 F.2d 747, 748 (1924).
355 Id.
356 Id. at 748.
357 Id. at 750.
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349
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sundry individuals and organizations working with or on behalf of the government.358
This point, in fact, was made by the Judge Advocate General of the Army (the “Army
JAG”) in a 1910 opinion issued in response to Squier’s inquiry about seeking a patent
on his invention.359 As part of Squier’s public proclamations about the dedication of
his patent to the public he even said:
I will say that I do not want one penny from any one for the discovery.
There will be no royalties attached to the use of the plans and
specifications, and the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, the War
Department, you, or I are as welcome as can be to take copies of these
specifications and build multiplex telephone. I have arranged it so that
these patents are in the name of the government and the people of the
United States.360
However, when a later Army JAG issued an opinion in 1918 stating that the 1883 Act
proviso covered only persons working for or on behalf of the government,361 Squier
suddenly changed his position and contacted AT&T to demand compensation of its
ongoing use of his patented invention.362 Then, in 1920, the Acting Attorney General
issued an opinion similar to the new position of the Army JAG.363 Squier thereafter
sued AT&T for infringement.364 Writing for the court, Judge Knox expressed
skepticism about the 1883 Act interpretations of the Army JAG and Acting Attorney
General.365 In doing so, he stated his belief that the Act should be interpreted on the
plain reading of its language, especially in light of the Patent Office’s longstanding—
and apparently heretofore unchallenged—practice of stamping “Dedicated to the
Public” legends on every patent issued under the 1883 Act.366 Ultimately, however,
Judge Knox did not decide the case based on this, but rather on Squier’s repeated
and painfully clear public statements that he had dedicated use of the invention to
the entire public, including AT&T.367 This effectively acted as an abandonment of his
rights.368 Notwithstanding the outcome, the case signaled a growing concern among
358
359

Id.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 748. The Army JAG opinion upon which Major Squier relied read:
The patent, if issued, will vest the property rights in Maj. Squier; but the final
clause of the above-cited act is to defeat any property rights in the patent within
the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the United States, as such rights are
prevented from accruing in Maj. Squier’s behalf, in the operation of the last clause
of the statute. It is therefore recommended that Maj. Squier be authorized to
apply for a patent in the operation of the Act of March 3, 1883, as it is the
operation of that act to throw it open to public and private use in the United
States . . . .

Id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 752.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 752–53.
368 Id. at 753.
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361
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government inventors that their magnanimous and public-spirited gestures of
“dedicating to the public” their inventions should not then accrue to the profit of
private businesses. In other words, this demonstrated the emergence of a desire to
separate commercial and noncommercial uses of federally funded inventions.
In 1928, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court
holding that a government employee had been specifically hired to invent and
assigning title to the government in Houghton v. United States.369 In so doing, the
court seemed to broaden the hired-to-invent rule from earlier cases by stating that:
[t]he right of the employer to the invention or discovery of the employee
depends, not upon the terms of the original contract of hiring, but upon the
nature of the service in which the employee is engaged at the time he makes
the discovery or invention, and arises, not out of the terms of the contract of
hiring, but out of the duty which the employee owes to his employer with
respect to the service in which he is engaged.370
At the same time, the court made it clear these were special facts because the
employee initially had an ordinary position, but was later asked to work on a special
project to invent and was expressly paid solely to produce the invention.371 But, the
case also signaled a shifting sentiment in the courts that inventions paid for by the
government and its taxpayers should be freely available to all:
It is unthinkable that, where a valuable instrument in the war against disease
is developed by a public agency through the use of public funds, the public
servants employed in its production should be allowed to monopolize it for
private gain and levy a tribute upon the public which has paid for its production,
upon merely granting a nonexclusive license [to the government].372
That same year, the 1883 Act was amended to change the troubled proviso.373
The new language read: “Provided, That the applicant in his application shall state
that the invention described therein, if patented, may be manufactured and used by
or for the Government for governmental purposes without the payment to him of any
royalty thereon, which stipulation shall be included in the patent.”374 This evinced
Congress’s clear intent that the Act was to provide a license to the government and
its contractors only and not a public dedication, which would undercut the whole
premise of a patent. At the same time, the shop rights rule was already granting
equitable licenses to the government for employee inventions, and in some cases, the
hired-to-invent exception was being applied to transfer title entirely to the
government.375 So, the only real benefit of the statute, as amended, would be for
inventions developed by government employees on their own time. But, the language
Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386, 391 (1928).
Id. at 390.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 391.
373 Act of April 30, 1928, ch. 460, 45 Stat. 467.
374 Id., 45 Stat. at 468.
375 E.g., Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 784 F.2d 747, 750–51 (1924).
369
370
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was not retroactive, and a subsequent case found that patents issued under the
original 1883 Act were still subject to the interpretation that they were dedicated to
the public.376
Also in 1928, the Supreme Court upheld the amended Government Use Statute
in Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States.377 In that case, the Court reaffirmed
that the sole remedy for patent owners in matters of infringement by the federal
government or its contractors was to seek compensation under the Government Use
Statute in the Court of Claims.378 Two caveats from earlier cases still seemed to
apply, however. First, the government must specifically authorize contractors to
practice the patented invention in question and consent to such use (and its
subsequent liability for compensation).379 Second, the statute would not apply where
a contractor still had a negotiated licensing agreement with the patent owner.380
Accordingly, this meant that the government and its contractors would be bound to
any licenses to which the contractor was a party before or during the federal contract
work.
Meanwhile, the government had already begun studying the nature of patents
arising under government service. As early as 1919 and 1920, a bill was sponsored
by the Interior Department to provide for voluntary assignment or license of patents
by any government employee to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).381 The FTC
could then license the patents to manufacturers, with any resultant license fees paid
into the Treasury, and whatever portion might be deemed equitable paid to the
inventor.382 The bill failed to pass Congress.383
In 1923, an ad hoc interdepartmental patents board, created by executive order,
recommended regulations establishing that, in the absence of a contract to the
contrary, government employees retain ownership of their inventions.384 The
rationale was that a dedication to the public would defeat the purpose and incentive
of a patent.385 It also strongly rejected proposals that government employees be
required to assign their inventions to the government, on the basis that it would be
very difficult to attract and retain talented individuals to the already low-paying
government positions.386 Finally, the board recommended legislation to establish a
permanent board with the power to demand assignment of government employee
patents where the inventions were related to national defense or were otherwise in
the public interest.387 Its power to demand such assignments would be founded on a
different part of the legislation that would make it an express term of government
See, e.g., Selden Co. v. Nat’l Aniline & Chem. Co., 48 F.2d 270, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 1930).
275 U.S. 331,346 (1928).
378 Id. at 306–08.
379 Act of July 1. 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 705 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)); supra
text accompanying note 344; Wood v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 296 F. 718, 722 (1924).
380 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924, 933–34 (4th Cir.
1925).
381 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 205–06 (1933).
382 Id. at 205.
383 Id. at 206.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 See id. at 206–07.
387 Id. at 207.
376
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employment that any inventions would be subject to the board’s power in this
regard.388 None of the recommendations were adopted.389
Coincidentally, in some universities, faculty had begun assigning their
inventions to the university as early as World War I.390 By the 1930s, a number of
universities had adopted institutional patenting policies.391 Notwithstanding, the
government had no uniform patent policy for intramural or extramural research, and
most of its funded research was devoted to “agriculture and the development of land
resources.”392
In the absence of government-wide policies or regulations, some government
departments had begun issuing regulations governing employee inventions.393 Thus,
in the 1930 case of Selden Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., the District Court
for the Western District of New York upheld employee invention regulations of the
Department of Agriculture as consistent with the 1883 Act and having the force of
law.394 The pertinent regulation required employee inventions to be “patented in the
name of the inventor without expense to him, in such a way as to allow any citizen of
the United States to use the patented article or process without payment of
royalties.”395 Because the case was decided after amendment of the 1883 Act, but the
patents were filed before, the question was raised as to which interpretation of the
Act would govern.396 The court held that the amendment was not retroactive.397 And
while it inclined towards the dicta in Squier, that the Act granted free rights to the
entire public,398 it focused its decision on the Department’s regulations and the
practice of the Patent Office to mark patents issued under the 1883 Act as either
Id.
Id.
390 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,212,945 to Thomas P. Haslam in 1917 (assigned to Kansas
Agricultural College); U.S. Patent No. 1,218,472 to T. Brailsford Robertsonin in 1917 (assigned to
University of California, by agreement); U.S. Patent No. 1,392,767 to Edward C. Kendall in 1921
(assigned to University of Minnesota); and U.S. Patent No. 1,491,900 to Daniel G. Chilson in 1924
(assigned to University of Arizona). The Author thanks Gregg Graff for these citations.
391 Archie MacInnes Palmer, University Patent Policies, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 96 (1934) (noting
that, among others, Colombia University, St. Louis University, and the University of Illinois had
patent policies in place by the early 1930’s).
392 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 13 (noting that, prior to World War II, the major focus of
government R&D was devoted to “agriculture and the development of land resources”).
393 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 22. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) had a
patent policy prescribed by Congress, in which the TVA retained sole and exclusive ownership of
employee inventions. Id. The TVA obtained “ownership of all inventions which bear some relation
to its functions, or involve the use of its time or facilities.” Id. Departments, including the Bureau
of Standards, the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce, the Food and Drug
Administration, and Department of Agriculture, among others, required assignment to the
government of inventions made in the course of employee’s official duties. Id. at 22–23.
394 Selden Co. v. Nat’l Aniline Chem. Co., 48 F.2d 270, 273 (1930).
395 Id. at 272.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 273.
398 Squier v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 F.2d 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) aff’d 7 F.2d 831 (2d Cir 1925).
The court in Squier noted that the plaintiff deliberately resorted to the 1883 Act because, under the
Act, “it was intended that the free use of the invention, instead of being limited to the government
and to persons engaged in work upon its behalf, should be open to any person in the United States
who desired to take advantage of its disclosures.” Id. at 753.
388
389

[12:145 2012] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

194

“Dedicated to the Public” or “Filed under the Act of Mar. 3, 1883.”399 It also
considered the inventors’ own statements in a printed publication that the patents
had been dedicated to the public under the 1883 Act and Department regulations.400
Thus, the court held that the patents were abandoned by the inventors and dedicated
to the public.401
Then in 1933, the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling, United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp.402 Two employees in the radio division of the Bureau of
Standards selected problems related to airplane radios that had been suggested by
the Navy.403 They did not seek patents under the 1883 Act as amended, but rather
filed as any ordinary citizen.404 They granted exclusive commercial licenses to
Dubilier Condenser Corporation405 and a license to the government for governmental
purposes.406 The government then sued Dubilier for a declaration that it was a
trustee for the government and thus required to assign all its rights, title, and
interest to the patents, as well as to make an accounting, to the government.407 The
government may have thought it could tap into the apparent trend of courts
broadening the hired-to-invent rule to allow a more general sense of hiring employees
in an inventive capacity because it did not otherwise have a particularly compelling
case. No real evidence was proffered showing that the inventors were specifically
hired or tasked to invent the devices they perfected and patented.408 It is also
unclear why suit was brought against the exclusive licensee of the patents. Even
though, in some cases, exclusive licensees who have all rights of the patent can have
standing to sue to enforce the patents, legal title is still held by the licensors.409
Both lower courts and the Supreme Court ruled against the government.410 The
Supreme Court may have taken the case in order to crop back the expanding scope of
the hired-to-invent rule and/or to limit the growing sense in some courts and corners
of the government that all inventions by government employees using government
resources should be dedicated to the public. This speculation may be supported by
the exhaustive manner in which the majority reviewed every major angle and
development in this area of law since Burn’s Case.411 Further, even the Court was
divided, with three justices supporting the government’s position that the patents
should be dedicated to the public, either through assignment to the government or by
cancellation.412 Notwithstanding, the majority re-established the basic contours of
Selden, 28 F.2d at 271–72.
Id. at 274.
401 Id.
402 United States v. Dublilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
403 Id. at 184–85.
404 Id. at 203.
405 Id. at 182.
406 Id. at 203.
407 Id. at 182.
408 289 U.S. at 193.
409 See e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (explaining that suit may never
be brought solely in the same of a licensee, unless it “is necessary to prevent an absolute failure of
justice, as where the patentee is the infringer, and cannot sue himself.”)
410 Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 182.
411 Id. at 186–208.
412 Id. at 209–24.
399
400
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the shop rights doctrine and its hired-to-invent exception, both for the private and
public sectors.
This remained the state of affairs into World War II. But, the dramatic upswing
in military manufactures needed during wartime meant that the federal government
needed to be able to procure such manufactures through its contractors at much
lower prices than it could have afforded during peacetime.413 Accordingly, Congress
amended the Government Use Statute again to clarify these issues in the Royalty
Adjustment Act in 1942.414 The amendment added language codifying the judicial
requirement for clear “authorization and consent” by a federal agency for the
contractor to use the specified patents or copyrights without authorization of the
owner and still be covered by the statute.415 It also sought to clarify that contractors
were not bound to existing licenses with patent owners while doing work for the
federal government if the hiring agency incorporated clear authorization and consent
language to use the patents in question independent of any license.416 This
essentially overturned the result in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v
Isherwood.417 Finally, the amendment served to settle any confusion in the courts as
413 See, e.g., Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United States:
Hearing on H.R. 7620 Before Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 3–4 (1942) (letter of Henry Stimson,
Secretary of War) (presenting draft bill to adjust government patent royalties).
414 Act of October 31, 1942, ch. 634 § 6, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014. The text of the amendment reads:
For the purposes of this Act, the manufacture, use, sale, or other disposition of an
invention, whether patented or unpatented, by a contractor, a subcontractor, or
any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government shall be construed as manufacture, use, sale, or other
disposition for the United States and for the purposes of the Act of June 25, 1910,
as amended (40 Stat. 705; 35 U.S.C. § 68), the use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with
the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States.
Id.
415 Id.
416 Adjusting Royalties for the Use of Inventions for the Benefit of the United States: Hearing on
H.R. 7620 Before Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 3–4 (1942) (letter of Henry Stimson, Secretary of
War). Mr. Stimson wrote:
In a number of instances, manufacturers with whom contracts for the production
of articles and materials for the War Department have been placed were found to
be manufacturing under licensing agreements entered into during peacetime with
the owners of patents covering the desired articles or materials, binding such
manufacturers to pay specified royalties.

....

Id.

The proposed legislation is designed to meet the existing situation and to aid in
expediting production for the prosecution of war.

417 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1925)
(holding that Government Use statute did not confine plaintiff to a claim against the U.S.
government for government contractors use of plaintiffs patent to build ships pursuant to a
government contract, and that plaintiff could pursue claim against contractor for patent
infringement royalties).
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to whether the Government Use Statute applied to federal subcontractors, as well as
The statute then remained
prime contractors, by explicitly adding them.418
unchanged until after World War II, when it was reworded and transferred out of
Title 35 into Title 28, which covers the judiciary and judicial procedure.419
Accordingly, by the end of World War II, the major contours of the first two
categories of government patent policy were established. First, inventions by
government employees would be owned by the employee, except where there was a
clear agreement that the employee was hired to invent that specific thing. The
government did not have an express license or shop right to use employee-owned
inventions, even if they were developed with government resources. But, it had a de
facto right to use them because government employees were barred by the
Government Use Statute from asserting claims against the government for such use,
even if it was for patents the individual obtained before employment with the
government.420 Second, the use of privately held patents, either directly by the
government or on its behalf by contractors and subcontractors, was deemed a lawful
appropriation or taking of a license as soon as the activity commenced. The only
recourse of the patent owner was to seek compensation from the Court of Claims.
Notwithstanding this conceptual clarity, many cases continue to come through both
the Court of Claims and district courts on various questions of jurisdiction, damages,
etc.421 The third category—ownership and/or use rights to patented inventions of
contractors (and their employees) developed under government contract—remained
quite undeveloped, despite its rapid rise in the wartime and post-war research
ecosystem.

Act of October 31, 1942, ch. 634, § 6, 56 Stat. 1013, 1014.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1498, 62 Stat. 869, 941 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C
§ 1498 (2012)).
420 But see Van Meter v. United States, 47 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1931) (hearing an appeal from a
district court decision in an infringement action against the U.S. government permitted by a private
act of Congress for an invention developed prior to government employment). Interestingly,
Congress was in some cases responsive to government employee inventor petitions for special
private acts granting the employee a right to bring suit for compensation in district court (oddly, not
in the Court of Claims).
421 See, e.g., Broome v. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., 92 F.2d 886 (1937) (rejecting plaintiff patentee’s
argument that use was actually by or for State of Ohio, and not federal government); Olsson v.
United States, 25 F. Supp. 495 (1938) (guns purchased from France, assembled in United States, but
then stored and unused, still constituted a “use” for purposes of Government Use Statute and
compensation to patentee); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762 (1940) (infringing items
made by private party for sale to government came within scope of Government Use Statute and so
compensation could not be awarded by district court); Identification Devices v. United States, 121
F.2d 895 (1941) (jurisdiction in district court is proper where claim is against private party for use
on behalf of government, but a rejection of a claim in Court of Claims directly against the
government does not give grounds for bringing the case in district court later; not all alleged harm is
compensable); Yassin v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 509 (1948) (neither the Lend-Lease Act nor the
Royalty Adjustment Act enlarged the scope of the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the
Government Use Statute); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633 (1950) (six year
statute of limitation not an issue where infringement is ongoing; each new act accrues a new cause
of action).
418
419
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III. POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY
President Franklin Roosevelt had desired to establish a uniform governmentwide patent policy for both government employees and contractors.422 In 1943, at the
height of World War II, he requested that the Attorney General undertake a
comprehensive investigation of the nature and extent of government patent
policies.423 The request anticipated the significant boom in post-war research funded
by the government and sought to answer a single question: “What disposition of
patent rights as between the Government, its employee or contractor, and what use
of patent rights owned by the Government, will best serve the public welfare and
stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts?”424 A year later, President
Roosevelt issued an executive order to create a separate register in the Patent Office
to record all government rights in patents.425
In 1947, the Department of Justice issued the Biddle Report in three volumes
under the title “Investigation of Government Patent Practices and Policies, Report
and Recommendations of the Attorney General to the President.”426 This report set
the stage for nearly all of the current debates and policies regarding both intramural
and extramural research patent policies. The Biddle Report was heavily biased
towards the position that federally funded inventions should be freely available to
the public.427 It also frequently incorporated what were essentially opinions or
recommendations into its “findings.” For example, a central finding of the Biddle
Report was that, with regard to inventions made by federal employees, “[i]nventions
financed with public funds should inure to the benefit of the public, and should not
become a purely private monopoly under which the public may be charged for, or
even denied, the use of technology which it has financed.”428
A further finding was that the government should obtain all rights to inventions
made by government employees: “(i) during working hours; or (ii) with a substantial
contribution by the government (in the form of facilities, equipment, materials, funds
or information, time paid for by the Government, or services of other government
personnel), or (iii) bearing a direct relation to the employee’s official functions.”429 In
cases where there was a less significant contribution by the government or a minor
relationship between the invention and the employee’s official functions, the Biddle

BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 9.
Id.
424 Id. at 2
425 Exec. Order No. 9424, 9 Fed. Reg. 51 (Feb. 18, 1944).
426 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 1.
427 Id. at 2. Importantly:
Federal participation in postwar research will be large and of major significance.
The fruits of this great national resource are advances in science and technology,
usually susceptible of civilian as well as governmental uses; and since many of
these advances consist of patentable inventions, their use and enjoyment by the
Government and by the people of the United States may depend upon the control
of patent rights.
422
423

Id.

428
429

BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 2.
Id.
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Report found that ownership should be left with the employee,430 subject to some
important caveats. First, the government should retain a perpetual, nonexclusive,
irrevocable, royalty-free license to make, have made, use, and dispose of the
invention.431 Second, the employee should have an obligation to exploit the invention
diligently him or herself or grant nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to all
applicants.432 In all other cases, the Biddle Report recommended that all rights
should be left to the employee.433 In essence, the Biddle Report was recommending
the adoption of an aggressive form of the shop rights doctrine. President Truman
implemented these recommendations in Executive Order 10096 in 1950, which is still
in force, as amended.434
The Biddle Report also found that the “public interest” required that patents
arising from federally funded research and development (“R&D”) be assigned to the
government:
Public control will assure free and equal availability of the inventions to
American industry and science; will eliminate any competitive advantage to
the contractor chosen to perform the research work; will avoid undue
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large corporations;
will tend to increase and diversify available research facilities within the
United States to the advantage of the Government and of the national
economy; and will thus strengthen our American system of free, competitive
enterprise.435
Further, leaving patent rights with the contractor might permit suppression of an
invention paid for by the public or the imposition of charges for use by the public to
private advantage. This could “unbalance” federal research by making those
programs, which were likely to lead to patents more desirable to contractors.436
“Expert opinion and experience within and without the Government” was cited to
support the contention that enough competent private and institutional labs would
accept contracts specifying federal ownership of patentable invention arising from
them.437 Nonetheless, the Biddle Report concluded that, in “emergency situations,”
exceptions could be made to this basic policy for situations in which the contractor
already had made a substantial independent contribution to the field of research.438
Id. at 3.
Id.
432 Id.
433 Id.
434 “Providing for a Uniform Patent Policy for the Government With Respect to Inventions
Made by Government Employees and for the Administration of Such Policy”, Exec. Order No.
10,096, 15 Fed. Reg. 389–91 (Jan. 25, 1950) currently codified at 37 C.F.R. 501 (1996). The policy
was challenged as unconstitutional in the 1970s and 1980s but survived. Heinemann v. United
States, 796 F.2d 451 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding the Truman Order constitutional based on Executive
powers and Congressional acquiescence for many years); Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th
Cir. 1976) (same).
435 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 3.
436 Id. at 2.
437 Id. at 4.
438 Id.
430
431
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The Biddle Report then recommended a uniform patent policy in which all
federal contracts for extramural R&D stipulate that the government would own any
resultant patents.439 The head of each federal agency, however, could certify that an
emergency existed and, with the approval of a central “Government Patents
Administrator,” award a contract allowing the contractor to retain title to any patent
inventions arising under it. This could be done on terms and conditions that the
Administrator would prescribe or approve and only so long as the contractor had
already made a substantial independent contribution to the field.440 However, any
such exceptional contract would be subject to the following conditions: (i) The head of
the agency and the Administrator would certify that reasonable efforts were made to
find a contractor that would accept federal ownership of patents, but these efforts
were unsuccessful; (ii) the contract would stipulate that the contractor would retain
patent rights only to those inventions in which its independent contribution
antedated the work called for in the contract; (iii) the contractor would grant the
United States a nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license to make, have made,
use and dispose of any inventions awarded to it under the contract; and (iv) the
contractor (or its assignee) would agree to place the invention in adequate
commercial use within a designated period, and if at the end of such time the
government determined that such use was not being made, then the contractor (or its
assignee) would be required to offer nonexclusive licenses at a reasonable royalty to
all applicants.441
The recommended requirements presaged the “Government License” and
“March-in Rights” developed in President Kennedy’s Patent Policy,442 and later
codified in the Bayh-Dole Act.443 It also established the terminology and basic two
types of “title” and “license” patent policy models.444 In a “title” model, the
government would take title to the inventions.445 In a “license” model, the contractor
would retain title, but grant the government a nonexclusive license.446 At the same
time, the Biddle Report also clearly distinguished among the three types of federal
funding agreements still used today—procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative
research agreements—and recommended that all three be treated under the same
basic policy and exceptions framework.447
Another central finding of the Biddle Report was that a uniform, governmentwide patent policy was indeed warranted and that it would “extend to all Federal
agencies the benefits of sound patent principles, will avoid competition among the
agencies, and will strengthen the Government’s bargaining position.”448 Exceptions
to the basic policy, if any, should also be governed by uniform principles and
Id. at 5.
Id. at 103–04.
441 Id. at 103–04.
442 Kennedy Patent Policy, supra note 37.
443 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.).
444 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 22.
445 Id.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 5.
448 Id. at 8.
439
440
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governed by the proposed Government Patents Administrator, to avoid conflict and
breakdown of the basic policy.449 The Biddle Report also concluded that, because the
policy governed only employment and contracting within the Executive Branch, it
could be effected through an executive order and then implemented by departmental
regulations.450 It would not alter or conflict with the existing patent laws or
system.451 The Biddle Report recommended that the proposed Government Patents
Administration should include both the Government Patents Administrator and an
oversight body named the “Advisory Patents Board.”452
The Biddle Report contained other findings and recommendations that are less
relevant to the legal focus of this Article, but still notable for current patent policy
debates. First, it found that systems of special financial rewards, promotions, or
salary increases based on development of patentable inventions could be
“undesirable” because they “might induce secrecy and lack of cooperativeness.”453
They could also pose administrative challenges in selecting the persons to be
rewarded, especially where the invention was the result of a group effort, and create
dissatisfaction among those not rewarded (even though they had done equally
worthwhile, but unpatentable work), possibly resulting in the slighting of work not
leading to patentable inventions.454 The Biddle Report recommended that any
rewards systems treat patentable and unpatentable research results equally.455
Second, it found that federally-owned inventions would best serve the public
interest by being made available to all on a “royalty-free, nonexclusive” basis.456 If
further risky development were needed so that private firms could market the
invention, then the government should finance such development.457
Notwithstanding, it still found that patenting of such inventions was superior to
simply dedicating the inventions to the public because patenting would afford greater
protection and control of the invention for the public interest.458
Accordingly, the Biddle Report recommended that: (i) All federally-owned
inventions “should be made fully, freely, and unconditionally available to the public
without charge, by public dedication or by royalty-free, nonexclusive licensing[;]” (ii)
as soon as any such inventions were completed they should be patented or published
(with full disclosure to the Patent Office to count as prior art to prevent others from
patenting the invention); (iii) all federally-owned inventions should be listed and
promoted in the register created under the Roosevelt Administration, with copies
distributed widely; (iv) to the extent funds were available, projects should be initiated
to demonstrate and publicize promising federally-owned inventions, especially to
small businesses; (v) the Government Patents Administrator or other federal agency
could recommend preliminary experimental, developmental, or pilot-plant operations
Id.
Id.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 3.
454 Id.
455 Id.
456 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 6
457 Id.
458 Id.
449
450
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to establish the practicality or effectiveness of a particular federally-owned invention;
and (vi) “[t]he Government Patents Administrator should prepare and submit to the
President for approval a program to encourage and sponsor the use and practice of
Government-owned inventions by small and new business concerns, and should
report periodically on the extent of use of Government-owned inventions.”459
Third, it recommended that the government should obtain foreign rights similar
to whatever rights it had in the United States to any federally-funded invention.460 If
the government later determined that it did not need such foreign rights, then it
could release them back to the employee or contractor.461 President Truman issued
an Executive Order implementing this recommendation that same year.462 It
appears to be the first uniform directive to apply to all departments and agencies
regarding patent rights arising from both intramural and extramural research
funding.
Fourth and finally, the Biddle Report recommended that:
[Government] [e]mployees and contractors . . . be required to agree, in
respect of any inventions made by them which the Government determines
should be kept secret, that they will not disclose the invention to any
unauthorized person, or assign any rights therein, or file any domestic or
foreign patent applications, unless and until authorized to do so by the
Government.463
Despite the quick implementation of some of the Biddle Report’s
recommendations by the Truman Administration, none of the others were acted on
throughout the 1950s. During that time, however, a number of statutes were passed
that specifically allocated patents arising from federally-funded extramural research
to either the government or contractors.464 A number of these were true “vesting
statutes” in which the normal default rule of inventor ownership was trumped in
favor of title allocation to a government entity.465 In the absence of a uniform
government-wide patent policy, the various agencies went their separate ways with

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
461 Id.
462 Providing For The Protection Abroad of Inventions Resulting From Research Financed by
the Government, Exec. Order No. 9865, 12 Fed. Reg. 3907 (June 14, 1947).
463 BIDDLE REPORT, supra note 270, at 7.
464 E.g., National Science Foundation Act of 1950, ch. 171, § 12(a), 64 Stat. 149, 154 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1871(a) (2012)); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub L. No. 83-703, §§ 151–60, 68
Stat. 943, 943–48 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181–90); National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, Pub. L. 85-568, § 305, 72 Stat. 426, 435–37 (current version at 51 U.S.C. § 20135); Helium Act
Amendments of 1960, § 4, Pub. L. 86-777, 74 Stat 918, 920 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 167b);
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L 87-297, § 32, 75 Stat. 631, 634 (1961) (current version
at 22 U.S.C. § 2572).
465 E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 152 (as amended by Pub. L. 87-206, sec. 10, § 152, 75 Stat
475, 477 (1961)) (providing that title to inventions in the field of atomic energy “shall be vested in,
and be the property of, the [Atomic Energy] Commission . . . .”).
459
460
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different title or license policies for patents arising from extramural federally funded
research.466
It was not until the Kennedy Administration that a uniform, government-wide
policy governing extramural research inventions was established (the “Kennedy
Patent Policy”).467 The Kennedy Patent Policy established nearly all the key concepts
and terminology of the modern government R&D procurement and technology
transfer system established under the Bayh-Dole Act (albeit with many of them
adapted from the Biddle Report).468 In particular, the core elements of the
Government License and March-In Rights were in place.469 The Kennedy Patent
Policy also included detailed requirements for contractors who acquired exclusive
patent rights.470 For example, the contractor would have to submit periodic written
reports to the funding agency regarding progress on commercialization of the
invention.471 In cases where the federal agency retained the patent rights, the
Kennedy Patent Policy imposed some conditions on the agency itself. First, if the
funding agency chose not to file for foreign patents, the contractor would be able to
file for that patent subject only to a non-exclusive license to the government for
governmental purposes and on behalf of any foreign government that would get such
rights under a treaty or agreement with the United States.472
The key divergence of the Kennedy Patent Policy from the Biddle Report was
that the former sought to establish a balance between government and contractor
ownership of patents arising from federally funded research: “[T]he public interest
might also be served by according exclusive commercial rights to the contractor in
situations where the contractor has an established non-governmental commercial
position . . . .”473
By contrast, the Biddle Report strongly urged government
ownership and/or public dedication of federally funded inventions. Under the
Kennedy Patent Policy, funding agencies should consider whether inventions arising
under federal funding agreements could productively be practiced directly by the
public (e.g., a farming technique), or whether intervening R&D and private initiative
was needed to turn the invention into a product that could be made available to the
public (e.g., a complex manufactured device).474 The Kennedy Patent Policy seemed
primarily focused on private sector contractors, rather than university and nonprofit
research organization contractors: Contractors who retained title or exclusive rights
must bring those inventions to “the point of practical application,” defined as “to
manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to practice in the case of a
process, or to operate in the case of a machine and under such conditions as to
establish that the invention is being worked and that its benefits are reasonably
accessible to the public.”475
See Kennedy Patent Policy, supra note 37, at 10,943.
Id.
468 Id. at 10,943–46.
469 Id. § 1(a)–(c),(f)–(g).
470 Id. § 1(a)(4)(i)–(ii).
471 Id. § 1(e).
472 Kennedy Patent Policy, supra note 37, § 1(h).
473 Id. at 10,943.
474 Id. at 10,944.
475 Id. § 3(g).
466
467
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Notwithstanding the soundness of the Kennedy Patent Policy, it was never
adopted as a government-wide regulation. This was likely because of the myriad
special title allocation statutes that Congress had passed. It was not until the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 that anything approaching a binding
government-wide contractor patent policy was put into effect.
CONCLUSION
From the early days of the Republic, Congress and the federal courts grappled
with the government’s rights to own or use patents it issued. Courts rejected the
British Crown Rights rule that allowed the sovereign to practice whatever patents it
issued. Instead, the federal government was conceptualized as a legal person on par
with any other persons with regard to issued patents. But, this simple rule
presented challenges as complexities arose in three intertwined patent rights
scenarios. The first involved inventions by government employees. The second
revolved around government and government contractor use of patents held by
private citizens. And the third involved inventions by federal contractors, and their
employees, arising under federal funding. While these three scenarios seem quite
distinct today, this Article revealed the convoluted nineteenth and early-twentieth
century case law that often treated them as overlapping. The confusion was not fully
resolved until the mid-twentieth century. At that time, a combination of executive
branch policy, Congressional legislation, and judicial developments set the roots of
current government patent policy.
Notwithstanding the clarity that has come from disentangling these three
different scenarios, fundamental issues remain. First, the indirect endorsement of
eminent domain takings of licenses to privately held patents under the Government
Use Statute still does not eliminate the questions of how this squares with the early
Supreme Court cases rejecting any kind of Crown Right in the United States, and
whether the government’s eminent domain powers with regard to patents are limited
to those covered by the Statute. This has been underscored by the multiple cases and
appeals in Zoltek Corp. v. United States.476 At the heart of those cases has been
confusion over whether the Government Use Statute applies to the infringement of a
patented process by or on behalf of the government where the alleged infringement
occurred, in part or in total, offshore. If it does not, then another area to explore
might be whether the patentee has any takings claim under the Tucker Act.477 Or is
the patentee out of luck just like the pre-Government Use Statute patentees who
could not show any kind of express or implied contract with the government? The
latest opinion from Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems to resolve these
questions by invoking the direct infringement liability of a party who imports a
476 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 831–32 (2002); Zoltek Corp. v. United States,
58 Fed. Cl. 688, 689 (2003); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 409, 414-17 (2009); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d
1309, 1322–24 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
477 See Richard T. Ruzich, Government Patent and Copyright Infringement Overseas Under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 (in the Shadow of the RIM Decisions), 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 410 (2005).
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manufacture produced overseas by a process patented in the United States.478 This
may then bring the complaint back within the scope of the Government Use Statute
and head off any attempts to rely on the Tucker Act for a general takings claim.
Second, the question of whether Bayh-Dole had allocated title to federally
funded inventions as between contractors and their employees was never directly
addressed before Stanford v. Roche.479 While regulations before and after the
passage of Bayh-Dole seemed to make clear that contractors had the obligation to
secure adequate rights from their inventive employees to protect the government’s
interests under funding agreements, this seems to have been lost in the mix
somewhere.480 In its place was a vague sense, among university administration in
particular, that Bayh-Dole had automatically transferred title from employee
inventors to the contractor by operation of law. In fact, Bayh-Dole simply regulated
the relationship between the contractor and the government.481 Some had tried to
treat contractors and their employees as if they were directly employed by the
government. But, the history belies this as a serious consideration. In the end, as
the Court in Stanford v. Roche had to concede, the question of title as between
contractors and their employees was simply not addressed as a legislative matter,
but rather left to the negotiation and private ordering of the parties.482
In sum then, the three categories of government patent policy are still works-inprogress. We have not resolved all the nuances and issues. Nonetheless, significant
progress has been made. In some cases, the progress is simply greater clarity about
the differences among the three categories and their subcategories. In other cases,
statutory, regulatory, or case law has established a working rule that advances
equity among the government, its employees and contractors, and unaffiliated patent
owners. More work needs to be done as the United States continues to break new
ground on a system that, at its core, treats the government itself as just another
private citizen who must engage with other citizens regarding what it is doing and
which rights it has.
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